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Even though the Moroccan king’s readiness to intro-
duce reforms in response to the mass protests in 2011 
has prevented the kind of radical change occurring 
in many other countries in the MENA region and has 
maintained the country’s relative stability, Morocco’s 
social peace remains fragile. Social unrest has flared 
recurrently, most prominently in the Rif region, as 
socio-economic grievances persist. The country con-
tinues to suffer from significant regional disparities, 
a poor education system, and high unemployment, 
especially among the young.
Socio-economic deprivation and the perceived lack 
of opportunities have also been key drivers of radi-
calization and irregular migration, especially among 
Moroccan youth. Introducing comprehensive policies 
to address the country’s socio-economic problems is 
essential for the country’s development and stabil-
ity. This is becoming even more urgent as Morocco is 
hosting a growing number of migrants and refugees.
It is in the EU’s interest to support the Moroccan gov-
ernment in these efforts, not least because it relies 
on Morocco to control migration flows from Sub-Sa-
haran Africa and conflict zones in the MENA region 
to the EU. The following paper collection analyzes 
key aspects of Morocco’s migration, education, and 
employment challenges and provides recommenda-
tions for the Moroccan government as well as the 
international community, particularly the EU.
This edited volume brings together papers written 
by the participants of the workshop “Promotion of 
Think Tank Work on Migration and Socio-Economic 
Challenges in Morocco,” which is part of the DGAP’s 
pro ject “Promotion of Think Tank Work and Related 
Institutions in the MENA Region and Europe.” The 
authors analyze various aspects of the socio-eco-
nomic and migration-related challenges that 
Morocco faces and develop policy proposals both 
for the Moroccan government and the EU. Among 
the recommendations are the following: In order to 
ensure that the government’s current initiatives are 
more successful, a holistic approach to education 
reform is needed that addresses the different factors 
impacting the quality of education. This includes a 
higher quality of instruction by improving teacher 
trainings, attracting foreign teachers to fill current 
personnel gaps, and adjusting school curricula and 
vocational training to better match the skills required 
by the labor market.
A successful education reform could also provide a 
crucial part of the solution to Morocco’s other chal-
lenges. Improving the quality and inclusivity of the 
education system would not only increase young 
people’s chances in the labor market and provide the 
Moroccan state with a better skilled and more pro-
ductive labor force but would also help reduce the 
risks of radicalization and irregular migration. To this 
end, greater cooperation and knowledge-transfer 
between the different stakeholders involved in the 
education sector is strongly recommended. Moroc-
can civil society in particular needs to be more 
closely involved in the field of education reform. The 
Moroccan government as well as the EU should also 
allow Morocco’s civil society to take part in a more 
targeted way in decision-making processes regarding 
migration policies. This would be an important step 
to address the needs and improve the human rights 
condition of migrants in Morocco.
In addition, as the EU remains an important partner 
for Morocco, the authors recommend that European 
countries evaluate and readjust their support to bet-
ter address the current socio-economic needs and 
challenges. This includes improving coordination 
between the EU’s European Neighborhood Policy 
and its blending of financial instruments to ensure 
that it does not only address labor market challenges 
but tackles its structural problems. While education 
reform is first and foremost a national issue, Euro-
pean countries like Germany can provide some sup-
port through the transfer of expertise within the 
wider framework of educational cooperation pro-
jects.
The Contributions in Short
“Formalizing the Informal Sector – Youth Employment 
in Morocco”: Saad Aldouri argues that the size and 
structure of Morocco’s large informal sector rep-
resents a key challenge to the country’s economic 
growth. In addition, the shortage of more secure jobs 
in the formal economy carries the risk of breeding 
social unrest. He emphasizes that the Moroccan gov-
ernment needs to provide viable alternatives to infor-
mal employment in order to effectively draw youth 
from the informal to the formal economy.
“Money Can’t Buy Labor – Prospects for the Impact of 
Renewed EU Foreign Policy Instruments in Morocco”: 
Francesca Fabbri assesses EU policies to support 
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labor market development in Morocco. She argues 
that the structural problems of Morocco’s labor mar-
ket, such as its non-inclusivity, the large size of the 
informal sector, and corruption, require better coor-
dination between the EU’s initiatives to blend financ-
ing instruments and its European Neighborhood Pol-
icy.
“English and Personnel Exchanges – Education Policy 
Strategies for Economic Growth and Greater Moroccan 
Socio-Political Integration in ECOWAS”: Imru Al Qays 
Talha Jebril emphasizes the importance of improving 
English language instruction in Morocco. This would 
not only increase the employability and competitive-
ness of its young work force, but also facilitate the 
country’s regional integration, e.g. into the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the 
African Union.
“Reforming the Moroccan Education System Through 
Enhancing Coordination Between Civil Society Orga-
nizations and Public Authorities”: The paper by 
Rokaya El-Boudrari argues that civil society organi-
zations play a key role in Morocco’s education sec-
tor. Yet their experiences and expertise are insuffi-
ciently taken into account by the government when 
designing and implementing reform initiatives. She 
emphasizes the importance of improved cooperation 
between the Moroccan government and civil society 
organizations in the formulation and implementation 
of a comprehensive education reform.
“In-Service Teacher Training in Morocco”: In her 
paper, Khadija Ouadi focuses on the training of 
teachers as a key element to improving the quality 
of education in Morocco. She argues that the current 
education system suffers from the heterogeneity of 
training systems for teachers, restrictive recruitment 
mechanisms, and the lack of appropriate in-service 
training for teachers. The shortcomings of the train-
ing system negatively impact the quality of instruc-
tion.
“Learning Through Serious Gaming – Improving 
Moroccan Higher Education”: The paper by Benedikt 
van den Woldenberg focuses on the introduction of 
new teaching methods to improve higher education 
in Morocco. He stresses that the current education 
system in Morocco relies heavily on teacher-cen-
tered teaching, which is not inducive to creating a 
learning environment that fosters creativity, prob-
lem-solving skills and a more contextualized under-
standing of a given issue.
“The Role of Extracurricular Activities in Preventing 
Irregular Migration and Youth Radicalization”: The 
paper by Richard Grieco focusses on drivers of irreg-
ular migration and youth radicalization in Morocco. 
Both radicalization and migration are considered to 
have similar root causes stemming from a perceived 
lack of opportunities for personal and professional 
development. He draws on the experience of the Ital-
ian NGO Progettomondo.mlal, which has been work-
ing in Morocco since 2001 to develop policy recom-
mendations.
“Moroccan Migration Policy – Education as a Tool to 
Promote the Integration of Sub-Saharan Migrants”: 
Mohammed Ouhemmou discusses key challenges of 
the Moroccan education system that hinder the inte-
gration and socio-economic mobility of Sub-Saharan 
migrants into Moroccan society. He argues that while 
a policy reform in 2013 has improved their access to 
the Moroccan education system, language difficul-
ties, the inability of teachers to cater to the specific 
needs of migrant students, the lack of pre-school 
programs, and racial discrimination continue to pose 
significant challenges.
“Obstacles Facing Asylum Seekers in North-Eastern 
Morocco”: In his paper, Jaouad Benaicha focuses on 
two key obstacles that asylum seekers face in cities 
like Nador and Oujda in the North-East of Morocco: 
travel difficulties due to financial constraints, which 
hinders their ability to complete their official request 
for asylum with the UNHCR based in Rabat, and vio-
lations of their rights under UNHCR protection by 
local authorities.
“Building Bridges – Moroccan Civil Society as a Medi-
ator in EU Decision-Making on Migration”: Ilham Siba 
assesses the impact of EU migration policies and the 
mobility partnership signed between the EU and 
Morocco on migrants in Morocco, highlighting the 
critical human rights conditions many of them face in 
Morocco. She emphasizes that Moroccan civil soci-
ety organizations play a key role in improving Moroc-
can migration policies and implementing initiatives 
to foster the integration of migrants into Moroccan 
society.
Chapter I: Labor Market 
Reform
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FORMALIZING THE INFORMAL 
SECTOR – YOUTH EMPLOYMENT IN 
MOROCCO
Saad Aldouri
The large informal sector in Morocco hinders eco-
nomic growth and the country’s ability to provide 
formal employment to a growing youth population.1 
Without managing the informal sector’s size and the 
drivers behind its growth, Morocco may fail to ease 
youth employment pressures. Tackling skills gaps, 
worker’s rights, and involving youth movements and 
civil society should be at the core of the search for via-
ble, sustainable solutions.
According to World Bank economist Norman Loayza, 
the informal sector is “the set of economic units that 
do not comply with government-imposed taxes and 
regulations,” which “arises when excessive taxes and 
regulations are imposed by governments that lack 
the capability to enforce compliance.”2 As in other 
low-income developing countries, the Moroccan 
informal sector is characterized by its heterogeneity. 
Mobile activities relating to trade, such as traditional 
industries, services, construction and public works, 
and property, provide many employment activities 
within the informal sector.3 In terms of qualifica-
tions, the education levels of informal sector workers 
indicate a significant skills gap. Results from a 2010 
survey showed that 33 percent were illiterate, 40.7 
percent had primary education, 23 percent had sec-
ondary education, and three percent were pursuing 
further education.4
According to one 2015 estimate, the size of the 
Moroccan informal sector was equivalent to 43 per-
cent of GDP.5 This startling size reveals both the 
extent of the challenge facing Morocco, and the 
impact of the sector’s various drivers. As a devel-
oping economy, several fault lines exist that are not 
effectively regulated, and which are exploited by the 
informal sector. Indeed, part of the difficulty in reg-
1 According to the conventional definitions used by international financial institutions such as the World Bank, “youth” is defined as the ages between 
15-24. See Leila Rafei, “Where in the world are young people out of work?” World Bank, 6 August 2014 <https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/where-
world-are-young-people-out-work> (accessed November 14, 2017).
2 Norman Loayza, “The Economics of the Informal Sector,” Policy Research Working Paper, World Bank, February 1997, p. 1.
3 Fazl Boukhriss, “Informal Labor: Morocco,” Arab NGO Network for Development <http://www.annd.org/cd/arabwatch2016/pdf/english/15.pdf> 
(accessed March 20, 2018).
4 Ibid, p.159.
5 Outhmane Bourhaba and Hamimida Mama, “An Estimation of the Informal Economy in Morocco,” International Journal of Economics and Finance 9 
(2016), p. 145.
6 Brian McCaig, “Why developing countries should create more formal jobs,” World Economic Forum, August 5, 2015 <https://www.weforum.org/
agenda/2015/08/why-developing-countries-should-create-more-formal-jobs/> (accessed June 17, 2018).
7 Diego F. Angel-Urdinola and Kimie Tanabe, “Micro-determinants of Informal Employment in the Middle East and North Africa Region,” 
World Bank, SP Discussion Paper No. 1201, January 2012, p. 22 <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/843621468275089806/ 
pdf/665940NWP00PUB0Box365795B0SPDP01201.pdf> (accessed June 17, 2018).
ulation is due not only to governance shortcomings, 
but also the large number of employees outside the 
formal sector, who avoid these regulations out of 
self-interest.
As in other developing, low-income economies, 
the informal sector in Morocco has a growing and 
increasingly important share of output and employ-
ment. This is, of course, to the detriment of the for-
mal economy, and makes it difficult to state the true 
levels of youth employment. Indeed, difficulty in find-
ing employment in the formal economy is common-
place in low-income countries, where employment is 
often dominated by informal businesses that account 
for a large share of the workforce, and represent a 
major source of livelihood for the poor.6
A core characteristic of activity in informal econo-
mies is low productivity. The existence of a signif-
icant informal sector workforce that lacks essential 
protections, such as health insurance and pensions, 
has a decidedly adverse impact on an economy’s 
labor productivity. Additionally, the fact that formal 
sector employees tend to earn more than informal 
sector workers also correlates with the disparity in 
productivity between the two groups.7 Leaving work-
ers unprotected in the informal sector is intrinsi-
cally linked to the sector’s low productivity and the 
subsequent impact this has on the wider Moroccan 
economy. This brings into question the sustainability 
of such an arrangement, and whether a low-income 
economy can continue to develop without address-
ing this disparity.
The drivers of the Moroccan informal sector are mul-
tiple. First, tax levels are popularly deemed too high 
and are therefore difficult to enforce. High taxation 
relative to national income levels can only contribute 
towards the amplification of the informal sector and 
the subsequent reduction of government revenue. 
The “tax burden” plays a critical role in the size of the 
informal sector: a one percent increase in personal 
income tax leads to a 0.11 percent increase in the 
Chapter I: Labor Market Reform
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informal sector.8 With the current personal income 
tax rate at 38 percent, the impact of the “tax burden” 
is not insignificant, and poses a constant challenge.
Second, corruption undermines adherence to regu-
lations in the formal sector, as many within the infor-
mal sector seek to maximize their profits as a result.9 
Third, like many developing economies, Morocco is 
increasingly undergoing urbanization, and the formal 
sector’s inability to absorb the increasing numbers of 
employment-seekers in cities leads them to turn to 
the informal sector.10 This is a survival mechanism 
that further increases pressure on the state to pro-
vide more jobs in the public sector in order to help 
absorb the growing numbers of potential workers in 
urban environments.
The formal economy in Morocco is mainly com-
prised of the public and agricultural sectors. Tra-
ditionally, the public sector has been regarded as a 
form of secure, desirable work, and has been a major 
employer in Morocco and across the Arab world. 
However, its unsustainability has led to initiatives to 
reduce public sector employment as a share of total 
employment. The economic and structural adjust-
ment programs implemented in the 1990s to address 
high levels of public sector debt led to a squeeze on 
public sector employment.11 This indirectly impacted 
on the informal sector, boosting its size as the gov-
ernment struggled to reign in its activity.12 Increasing 
arrivals from rural areas, coupled with the reduc-
tion in public sector jobs, have produced a grow-
ing number of urban dwellers engaged in informal 
commercial activities. Particularly for male workers, 
this reflects the shift from agricultural sector work 
to the services sector, which is taking an increas-
ingly large share of jobs. One of the main challenges 
is the growth of short-term or temporary employ-
ment contracts associated with this trend. Offering 
short-term contracts is often seen as an easy way to 
avoid giving workers the full rights and social secu-
rity guarantees enjoyed by those working full-time in 
8 Bourhaba and Mama, “An Estimation of the Informal Economy in Morocco,” p. 145.
9 For more information on the levels of corruption in Morocco and links to financial gains, see Transparency International, “People and Corruption: Middle 
East and North Africa Survey 2016” <https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/people_and_co rruption_mena_survey_2016> (accessed April 
9, 2018).
10 Bourhaba and Mama, “An Estimation of the Informal Economy in Morocco,” p. 145.
11 Kaylee Steck, “The Future of Morocco’s Informal Economy,” Fair Observer, August 27, 2016 <https://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_
africa/futu re-moroccos-informal-economy-74001/> (accessed November 10, 2017).
12 Angel-Urdinola and Tanabe, “Micro-determinants of Informal Employment,” p. 3.
13 Daniela Marotta, Paul Prettitore and Paolo Verme, “Gender Inequality, Structural Transformation and Growth: The case of Morocco,” World Bank, 
December 2015, p.8.
14  “Morocco – Agriculture Sector,” United States Department of Commerce, October 25, 2017 <https://www.export.gov/article?id=Morocco-Agricultural-
Sector> (accessed November 11, 2017).
15 Angel-Urdinola and Tanabe, “Micro-determinants of Informal Employment,” p. 22.
16 Boukhriss, “Informal Labor: Morocco,” p. 160.
the formal sector. This factor enlarges the informal 
sector’s share of jobs, and can be mitigated by legis-
lation to prevent employers taking advantage of such 
arrangements.
Although its market share has decreased due to 
increasing urbanization, Morocco’s agricultural sec-
tor still constitutes a relatively large share of overall 
employment. Increasingly, it is dominated by women 
in rural communities, as men continue to move to 
cities and towns in search of more secure employ-
ment.13 Agriculture contributes around 15 percent of 
Moroccan GDP,14 and still retains a decisive year-on-
year impact on the growth of Moroccan GDP, such as 
in 2015, where strong agricultural performance con-
tributed to overall growth. This sector is also associ-
ated with higher levels of informality.15
In the light of the gradual decline in informal agri-
cultural work, informal employment in urban envi-
ronments has grown. Indeed, most informal employ-
ment in non-agricultural sectors is urban-based, 
with seven out of ten informal production units 
being based in cities.16 The gradual urbanization of 
the informal sector is indicative of how the wider 
Moroccan economy is developing, with attempts 
to diversify revenue streams resulting in a greater 
emphasis on service sector development. Accord-
ingly, as increasing numbers of young people enter 
the workforce, their focus will be on finding employ-
ment in the growing service sector, which should be 
targeted for regulation and formalization in order 
to reduce the informal sector’s market share in the 
medium- to long-term.
Youth Employment Trends in Morocco
With youth comprising around 44 percent of Moroc-
co’s working population and approximately thirty 
percent of the total, an awareness of youth employ-
ment trends is central to understanding how jobs 
in the informal sector can be “formalized.” In 2016, 
Chapter I: Labor Market Reform
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youth unemployment in Morocco stood at around 
20.5 percent,17 which is also part of broader issues 
linked to poor social and economic inclusion.18 Addi-
tionally, the dynamics between employment and 
changing demographics often pose their own unique 
challenges, not least that of transition into work. 
Assaad and Levison argue that the transition into 
employment – and subsequently adulthood – is now 
more protracted, extending beyond the ages of 15-24 
to the 25-29 age bracket.19 Evolving youth employ-
ment trends mean that conventional understandings 
and definitions are changing in response to a multi-
tude of social and economic challenges. In Morocco, 
employment is linked both to the ability of the labor 
market to provide enough jobs, and the disparity 
between what young people are taught and skills the 
labor market demands.
Youth unemployment in Morocco is often linked to 
poor levels of education: around eighty percent of 
young people have not completed secondary edu-
cation.20 The Haut-Commissariat au Plan (HCP) 
estimated in 2015 that 27.9 percent of young peo-
ple were not in employment, education or train-
ing,21 detrimental in the medium-long term for both 
general employment and engagement in the formal 
economy. With the labor force growing two percent 
annually from 2000-2014, Morocco has suffered 
from its inability to match that growth with an equal 
growth in formal sector jobs.22 This also results in 
young people turning towards the informal sector as 
part of the “coping economy” which, while address-
17 “Morocco Youth Unemployment Rate,” YCharts, July 1, 2017 <https://ycharts.com/indicators/morocco_youth_unemployment_rate> (accessed October 
29, 2017).
18 According to the Haut-Commissariat au Plan, ‘youth’ employment refers to those aged 15-24. Haut-Commissariat au Plan et la Banque mondiale, Le 
marché du travail au Maroc: Défis et opportunités, November 2017 <https://www.hcp.ma/file/195496/> (accessed June 17, 2018).
19 Ragui Assaad and Deborah Levison, “Employment for Youth: A Growing Challenge for the Global Economy,” Minnesota Population Center Working 
Paper 2013-17, University of Minnesota, May 2013, p. 3.
20 Sustainable Development Department, “Kingdom of Morocco: Promoting Youth Opportunities and Participation,” World Bank, June 2012, p. ix.
21 European Training Foundation, “Morocco: Education, Training and Employment Developments 2016,” European Union, 2017, p. 6.
22 Uri Dadush, “Moroccan job market issues, and labour trends in the Middle East and North Africa,” Bruegel website, December 7, 2017 <http://bruegel.
org/2017/12/moroccan-job-market-issues-and-labour-trends-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/> (accessed February 23, 2018.
23 “Kingdom of Morocco: Promoting Youth Opportunities and Participation,” World Bank, page x.
24 Uri Dadush, “Moroccan job market issues.”
25 Martin Rose, “The Higher Education Trap,” The World Today, Chatham House, February 2018 <https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/twt/higher-
education-trap> (accessed March 15, 2018).
ing some short-term imperatives, is not sustainable. 
Opportunities for further development and finding 
pathways into the formal sector are essential. As of 
2012, 88 percent of employed youth worked without 
contracts, many of them in the informal sector.23 The 
social impact of failing to provide more secure jobs 
cannot be underestimated, and is one of the factors 
behind the social unrest that has flared intermit-
tently in Morocco since 2011.
The poor socio-economic background and educa-
tion levels of many young people provides an insight 
into the skills gap they face when trying to seek 
formal-sector employment. As Morocco’s economy 
develops according to global trends, the country is 
increasingly adopting more technology. The high-
ly-specialized skillsets required to participate in 
such an economy must be replicated so that educa-
tion and skills trainings are tailored to match labor 
force needs. This, together with capital deepening, 
would help explain the widespread perception of a 
skill shortage in Morocco.24
In 2015, the Moroccan Ministry of Employment 
and Social Affairs produced a national strategy for 
employment which focused policy around four main 
factors: promoting job creation among businesses; 
increasing the standard and value of human capital; 
reinforcing labor market mediation; and the devel-
opment of an effective labor market governance 
framework.25 Seeking to increase employability and 
promoting more inclusive policies seem to be an 
appropriate starting point, but this must be coupled 
with sustained support from the Moroccan govern-
ment.
The social impact of failing 
to provide more secure jobs 
cannot be underestimated
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Recommendations
 - Create viable jobs within the formal economy 
through an increase in jobs on the emerging mar-
kets
As part of the efforts to reduce the informal sec-
tor’s influence on the country’s GDP, a core objec-
tive should be to create viable jobs within the formal 
economy. Clamping down on employment within the 
informal sector without providing viable alterna-
tives is a threat to stability and development. There 
are opportunities to create more jobs in emerging 
markets, such as those in the digital and renewables 
sectors, following heavy investment from the govern-
ment.
 - Increase productivity within the labor market
The informal sector’s unproductive characteristics 
pose an obstacle to economic growth. Measures to 
combat this could include: adapting the skills of the 
labor force to new technologies (especially in relation 
to the digital economy), streamlining state bureau-
cracy, and tackling corruption.
 - Guarantee workers’ rights in the formal sector
The influx of workers to urban environments has 
generated a rise in informal sector employment in 
cities. Guaranteeing workers’ rights in the formal 
sector will incentivize workers to commit to employ-
ment within it.
 - Engage youth movements and civil society groups
To reach a viable restriction of informal sector 
growth, key stakeholders within Moroccan society 
should be engaged, not least youth movements and 
civil society groups. Frameworks and campaigns 
should be created within which stakeholders – youth 
movements and civil society groups – can feed into 
the policy process to find inclusive and sustainable 
solutions, and thus ultimately develop better-in-
formed policies.
 - Ensure the implementation of reform initiatives to 
address the skills gap
Formal sector employment often requires high voca-
tional skills, something not necessarily catered for 
in the Moroccan education system. Implementing 
reforms to address the skills gap in Morocco should 
be a major priority going forward. The Ministry of 
Employment and Social Affairs’ plans allude to initia-
tives that are being put in place, and which policy-
makers must ensure are carried out. The application 
of educational resources should therefore also be 
more targeted to provide the required skills, along-
side efforts to ensure widespread literacy.
 - Provide development opportunities to facilitate 
entry into the formal sector
Youth policies in Morocco should be more holistic 
when addressing the formalization of the informal 
sector. Education and vocational training must be 
accessible and meet the formal sector’s standards. 
Providing more development opportunities to facili-
tate entry into the formal sector is an important pol-
icy imperative that would help retain and cultivate 
human capital in Morocco.
 - Reform legal and administrative structures to 
reduce barriers to formal sector employment
In a policy environment that effectively discourages 
formal employment, making it costly and bureau-
cratic for employers, informal opportunities are 
often presented as short-term solutions. Encour-
aging formal employment through small and medi-
um-sized businesses has often been mentioned as 
a solution, but such efforts are undermined by the 
resistance of legal and administrative structures. 
Solutions to youth employment therefore extend 
beyond education reform to include labor market and 
other reforms.
Saad Aldouri was a research assistant with the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) program at 
Chatham House at the time of the workshop. He 
managed Chatham House’s Libya working group, 
has contributed towards the program’s work on 
Iraq and North Africa, and was the primary field 
researcher in Chatham House’s project “Young 
Arab Voices,” conducting research in five Arab 
countries including Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and 
Egypt.
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MONEY CAN’T BUY LABOR – 
PROSPECTS FOR THE IMPACT OF 
RENEWED EU FOREIGN POLICY 
INSTRUMENTS IN MOROCCO
Francesca Fabbri
The European Union supports Morocco in target-
ing challenges related to deep-seated socio-economic 
issues and in particular to the fragilities of its labor 
market. As the EU increasingly resorts to blending 
instruments to support these efforts, streamlining the 
reform agenda will be a key element in ensuring the 
impact of these funds. For this reason, a broader spec-
trum of EU policies and instruments will need to be 
taken into account, and coordination between them 
will be crucial for coherence and effectiveness.
The 2011 Arab uprisings were fueled by the quest 
for political freedom and civil liberties, as well as 
socio-economic grievances that exacerbated exist-
ing discontent. While the protests and unrest led to 
major political changes and setbacks in other coun-
tries, the Kingdom of Morocco seems to have pre-
served relative stability. Yet the reality is more com-
plex. As recent demonstrations in the Rif region26 and 
Jerada27 have shown, public dissatisfaction is growing 
in some of the poorest areas of Morocco.28 Triggered 
by separate incidents of workers’ deaths, protests 
rapidly moved from seeking justice on single issues 
to a wider outcry over socio-economic conditions. 
Morocco has the highest level of inequality of any 
country in North Africa,29 where regional disparities 
are rising, cronyism and corruption are widespread, 
and unemployment remains high, especially among 
youth. These and other socio-economic issues 
demonstrate the lack of both sustainable, more 
inclusive growth,30 and reform implementation. More 
generally, as in other North African countries, cor-
relations can be drawn between high unemployment 
26 Aida Alami, “Morocco’s Stability is Roiled by Monthslong Protests Over Fishmonger’s Death,” New York Times, August 26, 2017 <https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/08/26/world/africa/morocco-berber-rif-nasser-zefzafi.html> (accessed June 19, 2018).
27 Zakia Abdennebi and Ulf Lessing, “Miners’ protest raises political temperature in Morocco,” Reuters, February 2, 2018 <https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-morocco-protests/miners-protest-raises-political-temperature-in-morocco-idUSKBN1FM0IM> (accessed June 19, 2018).
28 Matthias Sulz, “Protests in Morocco,” ACLED, March 23, 2018 <https://www.acleddata.com/2018/03/23/protests-in-morocco/> (accessed June 19, 
2018).
29 Zakaria Lahrach, “Rapport d’Oxfam: Le Maroc, terre d’inéqualité,” HuffPost Maroc, January 1, 2018 <https://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2018/01/22/
inegalites-oxfam_n_19057162.html> (accessed June 19, 2018).
30 Inclusive growth is economic growth that allows vulnerable populations (the poor, women, youth) to participate in, contribute equally to, and benefit 
from economic growth.
31 The national illiteracy rate is higher than thirty percent for the population aged 15 and over. See UNESCO Institute for Statistics <http://uis.unesco.org/
country/MA> (accessed June 24, 2018).
32 “Jerada: le ministère de l’Intérieur rappelle qu’il est habilité à interdire des manifestations illegals,” Telquel, March 13, 2018 <http://telquel.
ma/2018/03/13/jerada-ministere-linterieur-rappelle-quil-habilite-interdire-manifestations-illegales_1583838> (accessed June 19, 2018).
33 “IMF Executive Board Concludes 2017 Article IV Consultation with Morocco,” International Monetary Fund Press Release No. 17/497, December 
14, 2017 <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2017/12/14/pr17497-imf-executive-board-concludes-2017-article-iv-consultation-with-morocco> 
(accessed June 19, 2018).
34 Haut-Commissariat au Plan du Royaume du Maroc (HCP) “Activité, emploi et chômage (trimestriel), troisième trimestre 2017” <https://www.hcp.ma/
file/199279/> (accessed June 24, 2018).
rates, especially among youth, and civil unrest. This 
is particularly true for a country where the capacity 
to generate educational31 and employment oppor-
tunities, and avenues for political participation,32 is 
limited.
Nonetheless, the EU considers Morocco a bulwark of 
stability and a reliable economic partner in a region 
increasingly plagued by disorder. Against the back-
drop of increasing destabilization in Morocco’s social 
fabric and labor market, it is imperative to analyze 
what the country’s precise needs are, and whether 
EU policies can effectively contribute through its 
current set of instruments and policies. More spe-
cifically, the EU has re-framed its foreign policy to 
pay greater attention to the resilience of states and 
societies in its neighborhood and, at the same time, 
has recently devised programs and instruments to 
increase private sector participation in development, 
aimed at stimulating growth and job creation.
Obstacles to Inclusive and Sustainable Growth in 
Morocco’s Labor Market
As illustrated by the recent unrest, Morocco is fac-
ing issues that arise from its development model. 
Protests in various parts of the country have called 
for improved living conditions, job creation, and a 
decrease in social marginalization. The macroeco-
nomic situation has been evaluated positively by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF),33 with low but 
positive growth rates of around four percent for 2017. 
However, growth indicators cannot provide a full pic-
ture of the country’s well-being, and macroeconomic 
growth has not translated into an inclusive employ-
ment dynamic with stable jobs. The unemployment 
rate reached 10.6 percent in the third quarter of 2017 
(up from 10.4 percent in the third quarter of 2016), 
and remains high among youth (29.3 percent).34 More 
concretely, Morocco’s precarious labor market is 
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characterized by its dual and non-inclusive nature, 
which indicates a rather negative perspective for the 
country’s development.
One of the main negative features of Morocco’s 
labor market is its non-inclusivity: young people and 
women are not sufficiently integrated. While the 
participation rate of men resembles that of countries 
with similar economic levels, women’s participation 
is particularly low at only 23.6 percent, less than a 
quarter of the active female population. On a positive 
note, the rate of youth enrolment in education has 
almost doubled, which may imply a future increase in 
skills. For instance, between 2000 and 2015, the share 
of those without a diploma in the 25-24 age group 
decreased from 34 percent to 22.8 percent, and from 
39.2 percent to 13.3 percent for those aged 15-24.35 
However, youth unemployment is on the rise. One of 
the main causes is to be found in the labor market’s 
difficulties in absorbing this population group.
Moreover, job creation measures have not yet been 
sufficient in absorbing the growth of the working-age 
population. On the one hand, employment in the for-
mal sector is concentrated in the hands of established 
large enterprises, and especially in the manufactur-
ing sector. On the other, small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) face many constraints, including 
corruption, low-skilled labor, low competitiveness, 
high labor costs, and informal sector competition, 
all of which decelerate their growth and reduce their 
ability to create jobs. A poorly functioning labor mar-
ket and the absence of lawful economic opportunities 
are likely to make illicit, informal economic activities 
more attractive. In fact, the Moroccan labor market 
is characterized by the preponderance of informality. 
Only half of male workers are salaried, and nearly half 
of all workers are unpaid family workers. Growth in 
the rural non-farm sector is slow, and most service 
sector jobs are concentrated in traditional low-pro-
ductivity services.
These issues become even more problematic in cer-
tain areas of the country as Morocco faces nation-
wide economic and development disparities as well 
as cronyism and corruption. Economic growth over 
the past fifteen years has succeeded in bringing 
down the overall poverty rate from 8.9 percent of 
the total population in 2007 to 4.8 percent in 2014.36 
Most remarkably, almost 19 percent of Morocco’s 
35 HCP and the World Bank, “Le marché du travail au Maroc: Défis et opportunités,” November 2017 <https://www.hcp.ma/file/195496/> (accessed June 
24, 2018).
36 Ibid.
37 “Moroccan Government Wants to Reduce Regional Inequalities,” Morocco World News, June 20, 2017 <https://www.moroccoworldnews.
com/2017/06/220562/moroccan-government-wants-reduce-regional-inequalities/> (accessed June 19, 2018).
agriculturally dependent rural population still live in 
poverty or are in danger of doing so. These poverty 
rates are thought unlikely to change with such slow 
economic growth and persistent economic inequality 
within the country, although a convergence between 
regions in terms of development has begun. Recent 
protests in Al Hoceima and Jerada have again shed 
light on the dramatic state of some of the poorest 
regions, and how the lack of wealth redistribution is 
interlinked with social unrest. Moreover, the Moroc-
can government recognizes regional disparities and 
the need for investment and development, but has 
also stressed that it is difficult to get investors to 
invest in poor and remote areas rather than richer 
coastal ones.37
The Moroccan Labor Market: The Need for Reform 
and the Social Contract
What is clear is that policy alone will not be able to 
solve the above-mentioned challenges quickly, but 
can contribute to the mitigation of the labor surplus 
that characterizes the country’s labor market. The 
current labor code in Morocco entered into force 
in 2004 to conform to international standards, and 
could be further reformed. More specifically, in the 
context of a dual and informal labor market, the 
labor code does not appear sufficient to regulate the 
above-mentioned issues.
One main feature of the current legislation is that it 
does not allow for a coherent social dialogue since 
small businesses, especially family businesses, are 
largely absent from representative bodies, whether 
they are employers or workers. For instance, the 
General Confederation of Enterprises of Morocco 
(CGEM) is the main employers’ organization with 
88,000 members and affiliates, but represents only 
about 14 percent of employers in the country, most 
of whom come from medium and large companies.
Furthermore, some categories of workers remain 
outside any legal protection, most notably maids 
working in private individuals’ homes and employees 
in traditional handicrafts. In Morocco, approximately 
half of total employment is informal or vulnerable, 
while the other half is regulated by the formal rules 
governing the labor market. In addition, the labor 
code does not address certain areas usually covered 
by this kind of legislation, such as vocational training, 
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social security, health protection, the mutual insur-
ance system, occupational accidents, occupational 
diseases, and trade union organization for civil ser-
vants.
At the same time, the discontent expressed in recent 
protests has targeted the Makhzen regime’s rampant 
corruption, poor governance, and appropriation of 
national resources. Generally speaking, the economic 
activities of elites associated with the King have 
not been addressed, and are largely or deliberately 
ignored by the media.
Resilience in the EU’s Southern Neighborhood and 
the Renewed Focus on Blending Finance
The EU maintains a close relationship with Morocco 
through the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), 
reinforced by the country’s advanced status. At 
the same time, over the past two years, the EU has 
revised its external policies and related instruments 
to better target the causes of instability in the MENA 
region, and to promote peace and friendly relations 
in areas close to its borders. The revised ENP and the 
Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Pol-
icy (EUGS) clearly reiterate these purposes.38
These recent documents have reframed EU foreign 
policy and recognized more explicitly that socio-eco-
nomic and political instability threaten states and 
societies in most MENA countries, underpinning 
the EU’s efforts to support value-based democratic 
transition, economic prosperity, and political stabil-
ity. In particular, resilience has been introduced as a 
guiding concept of EU foreign policy, as a means to 
enhance prevention and early warning, and as a long-
term investment in good governance, stability, and 
prosperity.39 Concurrently, Morocco has been indi-
cated as one of the countries where deeper relations 
will be pursued,40 through the negotiation of a Deep 
and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), 
and closer strategic and political consultations.
38 See the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/european-neighbourhood-policy-enp_en (accessed 
June 30, 2018) and “A Global Strategy to promote citizens interests” <https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-promote-citizens-interests> 
(accessed June 30, 2018).
39 “The EU, Resilience and the MENA Region,” edited by Silvia Colombo, Andrea Dessì and Vassilis Ntousas, Foundation for European Progressive Studies, 
2017 <http://www.feps-europe.eu/assets/3aab0c42-cfa4-42d8-b5b3-d33b5d20025c/the-eu-resilience-and-the-mena-regionpdf.pdf> (accessed June 19, 
2018).
40 “Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. 
Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy,” European Commission High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Brussels, 
November 18, 2015 <http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/documents/2015/151118_joi nt-communication_review-of-the-enp_en.pdf> (accessed 
June 19, 2018).
41 “Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” United Nations, A/RES/70/1 <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/
content/documents/21252030%20Agenda%20for%20Sustainable%20Development%20web.pdf> (accessed June 20, 2018).
42 “Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development,” United Nations, July 15, 2015 <http://www.un.org/
ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/CONF.227/L. 1> (accessed June 24, 2018).
In parallel, three recent dynamics have informed new 
approaches in EU foreign policy-making, mostly in 
terms of combining different sources of finance for 
development and growth. The first was the publi-
cation of the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda for Sus-
tainable Development41 and the Addis Ababa Action 
Agenda,42 which called for a stronger private sector 
role in global development. This led the EU and its 
member states to consider ways to implement this 
approach more concretely in their policies. Secondly, 
EU policy circles are expressing a growing interest in 
economic diplomacy and the use of public support to 
help businesses internationalize. Finally, the migra-
tion crisis in Europe, the subsequent adoption of the 
European Agenda for Migration, and the related new 
Partnership Framework with third countries, led to 
the emphasis on the “root causes of migration” in new 
policies and instruments. Among these root causes, 
the lack of growth and jobs in some key regions was 
identified as playing a central part in driving migra-
tion flows towards Europe.
As a result, a European External Investment Plan (EIP) 
has been launched, based on the assumption that 
classical development assistance was insufficient in 
addressing the lack of growth and jobs in regions 
closer and more interconnected to the EU. Public 
support had to be complemented by a new model 
of private sector participation. The EIP was then 
devised to create a single, more coherent frame-
work for existing investment facilities, while seek-
ing greater efficiency in sourcing private finance to 
stimulate reform and growth. It is articulated around 
three pillars: mobilizing investment through a new 
guarantee under the External Fund for Sustainable 
Development (EFSD); stepping up technical assis-
tance to develop projects and help mobilize higher 
investments; and improving the business environ-
ment by stimulating political and economic dialog 
and reform. The EIP aims to reverse the widespread 
economic trends of reduced Foreign Direct Invest-
ment and high unemployment, particularly among 
youth, across Africa and in the EU neighborhood, 
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thus serving broader efforts for stability and pros-
perity in the region.
EU Policies and Morocco’s Labor Market
As the EU seeks to use these policies and instruments 
to support Morocco in addressing its development 
problems, the EIP aims to create jobs and growth. 
Generally speaking, private investment financing is 
directed to increase the rate of capital accumulation 
in developing countries. As capital accumulation is 
expected to raise real wages and reduce poverty, the 
EIP could provide added value in Morocco’s quest 
to reduce its high poverty rate. However, previous 
analyses43 have revealed that growing capital accu-
mulation has not led to productivity gains, reduced 
poverty, or helped increase wages in Morocco, 
where structural unemployment and underemploy-
ment seem to be linked to difficulties in adapting to 
changes in the global economy.
In fact, the challenges of the Moroccan labor market 
refer to a broader spectrum of issues related to the 
growing socio-economic grievances underscored by 
recent protests. While non-inclusivity, difficulties in 
absorbing the growing labor force, and high levels of 
informality characterize the national labor market, 
the issue of regional disparities complicates the pic-
ture. Furthermore, problems related to governance, 
and in particular the need to reform the labor code, 
as well as widespread corruption and cronyism can 
only to be addressed through political dialogue aimed 
at a broader renegotiation of the social contract.
Moroccan policy-makers and the EU need to exam-
ine these and other issues in a comprehensive and 
coordinated manner. For the same reason, the focus 
on investment for development is certainly useful 
to address labor market challenges, but cannot be 
used as a means to solve its structural problems. 
More specifically, there is a need to consider how the 
blending initiatives can be better coordinated with 
ENP projects and initiatives to target the key reform 
needs in Morocco. At the same time, trade and mobil-
ity agreements also form part of the policy spectrum 
that the EU and its Moroccan partners can take into 
consideration to address the labor market problems.
43 Taoufik Abbad, “Capital accumulation and productivity gains in Morocco,” OCP Policy Center, Policy Brief 17/24, July 2017 <http://www.ocppc.ma/
sites/default/files/OCPPC-PB1724vEn.pdf> (accessed June 24, 2018)
44 “Programmation de I’Instrument Européen de Voisinage (IEV). Cadre Unique d’Appui pour l’Appui de l’UE au Maroc (2014-2017),” European Commission 
Directorate General for Development and Cooperation and the European External Action Service <http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/pdf/financing-
the-enp/morocco_2014_2017_programming_document_en.pdf> (accessed June 19, 2018).
45 Rosa Balfour and Richard Youngs, “Arab views on democratic citizenship and on EU support,” Arab Citizen28ship Review, No. 11, EUSPRING, October 
2015 <https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/irs/eusp ring/publicationsnew/arabcitizenshipreviews1/arab_citizenship_review_n.11.
pdf> (accessed on June 19, 2018).
46 Interviews conducted by the author in February-March 2018.
The current Single Support Framework of the EU 
to Morocco44 also identifies some of these problems 
among the main priorities in planning the partner-
ship for 2014-2017, and will certainly reiterate their 
importance in the next support period. In this con-
text, the Single Support Framework identifies the 
need to “promote sustainable and inclusive growth in 
favor of Human Development,” closely interlinked to 
“reinforcing democracy and governance.” However, as 
for other countries in the Mediterranean, the EU has 
rarely failed to be more player than payer. Most of all, 
in the growing gap between government – including 
the monarchy – and citizens, the EU’s efforts to sup-
port social justice in Morocco seem to be lost. While 
many Moroccans view the EU’s engagement with 
Morocco positively, the EU is often seen as a partner 
of the regime.45 These challenges are further com-
plicated by the fact that relations with the EU have 
recently been marred by Morocco’s reaction to two 
rulings at the European Court of Justice regarding 
agreements on trade and the Western Sahara.
All in all, what seems to be most needed in Morocco 
is a rethinking of the development model, involving 
a new social contract that places social justice at the 
core of economic measures aimed at attaining eco-
nomic growth. In aiming to better support Morocco 
as a partner and help the country preserve its sta-
bility, the EU needs to take this into account in its 
foreign policy agenda and implementation.
Recommendations
More could be done to avoid further destabilization 
and social conflict in Morocco. Both Moroccan and 
EU policy-makers still have the time and the tools to 
address the above-mentioned issues. Most impor-
tantly, a broader approach and focus on social jus-
tice and inequalities, as well as on good governance, 
should drive efforts on both sides.
 - Use revised EU policies to recalibrate EU-Morocco 
relations, placing greater emphasis on resilience
When the EU’s political dialogue with Morocco 
resumes after the current hiatus, and which seems 
to be the case according to officials on both sides,46 
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socio-economic issues will need to be placed strate-
gically at the forefront of future relations. The allo-
cation and disbursement of funds through existing 
instruments and their implementation will certainly 
continue to play an important role in funding the 
Moroccan economy, but business as usual should be 
avoided. The current framework of revised policies 
at the EU level provides the basis for recalibrating 
the engagement with Morocco and placing greater 
emphasis on resilience. In the specific context of 
blended finance, activities within the third pillar of 
the EIP will need to be closely coordinated with the 
programming of ENP instruments to ensure a focus 
on reform, and particularly on good governance.
 - Adjust reform priorities
The reform agenda will need to prioritize social jus-
tice in economic planning, reforming the labor code, 
making markets more contestable, and accelerating 
governance and business climate reforms, as well 
as other actions to accelerate growth. Additionally, 
measures to enhance job creation in the service sec-
tor will need to be considered, as this sector seems 
to be a larger job creator than the manufacturing 
industry.
 - Rebalance regional development
Another path of action should be to channel invest-
ment to more deprived regions by enhancing the pri-
vate sector participation, especially in those sectors 
and SMEs that account for the bulk of job creation in 
Morocco. This is particularly relevant to the imple-
mentation of European policies and blending ini-
tiatives, and the potential contribution of the EU to 
Morocco’s labor market.
 - Enhance mobility
Further paths of action should be identified for more 
advanced mobility and visa deals, where labor migra-
tion could be regulated and contribute to the coun-
try’s growth through further remittances. Moreover, 
investment in education is needed not only for long-
term benefits, but also to address the skills mismatch 
between educational levels and existing job market 
demands.
 - Ensure better governance
Reform should be directed at creating mechanisms 
of accountability that would check the power of the 
monarchy and rationalize policy-making.
 - Balance the effects of the focus on migration and 
Africa
As the EU is currently reviewing its budget for 
the period 2021-2027, questions remain concern-
ing where the EU’s political focus will lie, and how 
instruments will be modified accordingly. If migra-
tion takes the upper hand in Europe’s concerns, 
this might entail detrimental effects on the broader 
development agenda, including that for the European 
Neighborhood. At the same time, negotiations on the 
EU’s new relationship with African, Caribbean, and 
Pacific nations may also impact on relations between 
Europe and North Africa. More generally, because of 
Morocco’s recent return to the African Union, a more 
integrated African dimension may provide opportu-
nities for the country in economic and geopolitical 
terms, but how it will impact on relations with the EU 
is yet to be seen. As the EU prepares for both sets of 
negotiations, it will need to examine the effects that 
its focus on migration and the African dimension 
may have on Morocco and North Africa in general, 
especially bearing in mind the Maghreb region’s lack 
of integration. The EU should ensure that the focus 
on curbing migration flows does not overshadow or 
even undermine long-term priorities for develop-
ment in Africa, and the opportunities that greater 
economic integration and mobility entail for the con-
tinent as a whole.
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ENGLISH AND PERSONNEL 
EXCHANGE – EDUCATION POLICY 
STRATEGIES FOR ECONOMIC 
GROWTH AND GREATER 
MOROCCAN SOCIO-POLITICAL 
INTEGRATION IN ECOWAS
Imru Al Qays Talha Jebril
Morocco’s education reform includes the introduc-
tion of English as a language of instruction at earlier 
stages. However, there is a severe shortage of person-
nel who can teach English throughout the educational 
system. In line with Morocco’s greater regional inte-
gration into the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) and the African Union, Morocco can 
utilize its geopolitical advantage to establish person-
nel exchanges from West Africa and beyond to import 
English-speaking teachers, in exchange for exporting 
its own French-speaking instructors. This would fill 
the gap in the country’s own educational system, at the 
same time as increasing regional cohesion, geopolitical 
and economic ascendancy, and socio-cultural under-
standing.
Morocco’s educational system is outdated and los-
ing prestige. Not only does the country rank among 
the last in most international learning assessments 
(PIRLS and TIMSS)1 of pupils at primary, secondary, 
and higher levels, it also suffers from structural issues 
pertaining to language barriers, low school retention 
rates, gender disparity, and the mismatch between 
university instruction and job market demands. 
Moreover, the current migration of (mainly) West 
Africans hoping to reach Europe has created the 
unforeseen consequence of large numbers of new 
arrivals wanting to settle in Morocco, where they 
1 TIMSS (Trends in Mathematics and Science Study) and PIRLS (Progress in Reading and Learning Study) ranked Morocco second to last in math in 2003 
and last in reading in 2001. Aomar Ibourk, “Learning Achievement in Morocco: A Status Assessment,” OCP Policy Center, May 20, 2016.
2 “Morocco focuses on broadening access to education,” Oxford Business Group, January 24, 2017 <https://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/
wider-reach-sector-strategy-focuses-broadening-access-expanding-role-private-sector-and-vocational> (accessed January 16, 2018).
3 “The Global Competitiveness Report 2017-2018,” World Economic Forum <http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-index-2017-2018/> 
(accessed June 20, 2018).
4 Haut-Commissariat au Plan, “Démographie: Maroc” <http://rgphentableaux.hcp.ma/Default1/> (accessed July 17, 2018).
find it difficult to adapt in linguistic and socio-cul-
tural terms, secure decently-paid jobs, or enroll their 
children in regular public schools.
In response, Morocco is seeking to aggressively 
reform the educational sector. Despite the lavish 
spending, mostly on salaries – in 2016, Morocco spent 
DH45.8bn (€4.19bn) on education, around 26 percent 
of the national budget2 – it falls short of having a con-
sistent, long-term strategy to address structural dis-
crepancies, personnel shortcomings, archaic teach-
ing methodologies, and language diglossia, where 
Darija (the Moroccan dialect) is the native language, 
school classes are taught in Arabic, and French is 
used in higher education. The 2017-2018 World Eco-
nomic Forum report places Morocco 120th out of 137 
countries in terms of quality of education.3
English as a Path to Change and Growth
According to the 2014 census, 18.9 percent of Moroc-
can households speak English in some shape or form.4 
This figure surprised observers, as Morocco has tra-
ditionally been a bastion for “La Francophonie,” or the 
French-speaking elite in general. However, Moroc-
cans have recently realized that French is no longer 
the sole trajectory for development or provider of job 
opportunities, and that even French scientific mate-
rials are increasingly being published in the global 
lingua franca. English thus now represents a tool, 
and a new path for Moroccan economic growth and 
geopolitical goals. Yet it is not taught extensively in 
schools, and English-language instruction remains 
very meager compared to French or Arabic. This is 
due to the lack of coordinated efforts by the Ministry 
of Education and localities to fully integrate English 
into the educational system. English teachers are 
scarce, and are usually hired by private entities that 
pay much higher salaries than the public sector. In 
addition, the country has not yet established a law 
to make English an official, or even semi-official lan-
guage of the country (it is worth noting here that 
French is neither, but is still used as the main lan-
guage of business). 
Transforming Morocco’s educational system into an 
English-language system would make the country’s 
human capital more competitive and more interna-
English is important to 
 increase competitiveness 
and internationalization
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tional. This would also bring the benefit of making 
Morocco’s integration in ECOWAS smoother, enabling 
it to juggle between Francophone and Anglophone 
countries within the bloc, as well as opening the 
domestic market to attract English-speaking mul-
tinationals, so that they can find better human 
resources to meet their needs.
Furthermore, English could play a major role in 
improving the quality of research and instruction at 
all levels. If teachers can master the language, they 
will be able to be keep up-to-date with the latest 
educational materials, pedagogy, and instructional 
research. Moreover, greater use of English could 
also increase the diversity of academics who come 
to Morocco to conduct studies or research, and at 
the same time increase the prestige of the coun-
try’s universities, encouraging Moroccan academ-
ics to publish in the same language commonly used 
by most prominent scholars. In addition, it would 
allow Moroccans to rely less on the French market, 
and expand industries such as business outsourcing 
or manufacturing to trade with countries that use 
English for business. In that sense, a greater focus on 
English would give a competitive advantage to stu-
dents, businesses, and researchers in Morocco, and 
allow the country to become a multilingual bridge 
between the Francophone and Anglophone worlds, 
using that same diversity to establish a more diverse 
economic ecosystem that can sustain clients from 
both. 
If Morocco is to become an African financial hub, 
and a country endowed with human capital able to 
successfully work together with European, African, 
Asian, and Latin American interests, English (and, 
to a lesser degree Spanish) ought to be an integral 
component of the educational system, as well as a 
cultural tool to change attitudes and abilities within 
government, civil society, and the business world.
Recommendations
 - Set up mutual exchanges of teachers from West 
African countries
Morocco should establish links with ECOWAS mem-
ber countries to set up personnel exchanges of 
teachers, education specialists, and professors from 
West Africa, who can teach the sciences and human-
ities in English. In turn, this will increase the Moroc-
can population’s proficiency in English, and create a 
5 “Sur 16 000 étudiants africains au Maroc, 8 000 ont une bourse marocaine,” La Vie éco, September 20, 2013 <https://www.ccme.org.ma/images/
documents/fr/2013/09/LaVieeco2 0sept13.pdf> (accessed July 17, 2018).
healthy exchange of skills within the regional bloc. In 
return, Morocco can send its own French-speaking 
teachers to Anglophone countries, including Cam-
eroon, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. 
Therefore, as well as providing a competitive edge, 
this could also be a tool for regional and global geo-
political alignment and growth. Businesses and indi-
viduals in Morocco would greatly benefit from more 
business opportunities, including tourism, and would 
seek to achieve the proficiency in English enjoyed 
by, for example, Austrians, Norwegians, and Ger-
mans. In that sense, English is a globalizing factor, 
and the only way for Morocco to advance econom-
ically and realize its full geopolitical potential at the 
crossroads of Africa and Europe, the Mediterranean 
and the Atlantic. This exchange of human resources 
will further foster south-south cooperation, and help 
decrease the racist prejudices Moroccan students 
may have against Sub-Saharan African teachers.
 - Increase scholarships for African students
The number of scholarships granted to African stu-
dents (35,000 since 2005)5 should be increased to 
enhance Morocco’s soft power and diplomacy in the 
region.
 - Pursue education reform which is sensitive to the 
region’s history, culture, and economies
Greater cultural sensitivity should be reflected in 
Moroccan curricula and textbooks. Increasing the 
knowledge of these countries will help rapproche-
ment with the native populations, and would encour-
age Moroccans to identify as West Africans, rather 
than simply as Arabs, Berbers, or North Africans. 
This would create a dynamic in which Moroccans 
and ECOWAS populations could invest in each oth-
er’s economic space, promoting greater knowledge 
of local practices, and fostering entrepreneurship 
between countries in the region. Educational reform 
and an English-language overhaul of the country’s 
educational system represent an opportunity not just 
for Morocco, but also for mutual co-development in 
the region.
 - Foster diversification of educational outcomes and 
language specializations within schooling
Morocco is currently fashioning itself as a financial, 
trade, and logistical hub within Africa. The success 
of this endeavor depends on whether the country 
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can train its human capital in English, thus becom-
ing a hub for African linguistic and cultural diver-
sity. Through the diversification of educational out-
comes and language specializations within schooling, 
the diglossia of languages that currently exists in 
Morocco can be seen as a strength rather than a 
weakness. In fact, instead of focusing on making one 
language more important, or granting official sta-
tus to other languages or dialects (such as Soussiya, 
 Tarifit, Tachelhit, or Darija), Morocco needs to create 
an educational system that can cater to all the lin-
guistic diversity the country has to offer, be it Ara-
bic, French, Spanish, English, or even Portuguese and 
Wolof. 
Morocco’s strategy should be based on the fact that 
the more languages the people speak the better, 
which would translate into a diaspora with stron-
ger ties to a larger pool of potential markets, and a 
pool of human capital that is able to deal with a wide 
variety of clients speaking and trading in the differ-
ent languages within our region. While proximity 
to Portugal and Spain can also foster linguistic ties, 
Morocco could bring about more change by playing 
to its existing strengths, using Berber, Arabic, and 
French throughout West Africa.
Imru Al Qays Talha Jebril is a project manager 
and researcher at the Moroccan Institute for Pol-
icy Analysis (MIPA) as well as country researcher 
in the Independent Reporting Mechanism at 
Open Government Partnership (OGP). At the 
time of the workshop, he worked as a political 
advisor to the High Commissioner for Planning in 
Rabat, Morocco. He specializes in foresight and 
intelligence studies. He is also the founder and 
president of the think-and-do-tank EDFIRST, a 
non-profit organization dedicated to reform of 
the Moroccan educational sector through youth 
inclusion in the process.
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REFORMING THE MOROCCAN 
EDUCATION SYSTEM THROUGH 
ENHANCING COORDINATION 
BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY 
ORGANIZATIONS AND PUBLIC 
AUTHORITIES
Rokaya El-Boudrari
The quality of Morocco’s education system continues to 
be a key challenge for the social and economic develop-
ment of the country and the employability of Moroccan 
youth. In response, Moroccan governments have put 
several strategies in place over the past two decades. 
However, efficient reform of the Moroccan educational 
sector requires enhanced coordination between civil 
society organizations (CSOs) and public authorities. 
This can be achieved through the creation of a com-
mission dedicated to education, and composed of local 
educational NGOs, relevant stakeholders, and public 
authorities.
In 2012, the Haut-Commissariat au Plan (HCP, the 
public body in charge of surveys and statistics) con-
ducted a survey to determine which forms of welfare 
could positively impact living conditions in Morocco. 
Education unequivocally emerged as a priority for 78 
percent of Moroccans, ahead of proximity to schools 
(58 percent), medical coverage (49 percent), proxim-
ity to health facilities (38 percent), and the quality of 
health services (36 percent).6 These results indicate 
how Moroccans have become increasingly aware of 
the importance of education, especially in a coun-
try where social inequalities are entrenched, where 
democracy is still at an early stage, and where there 
are no (or very limited) natural resources on which 
to rely.
Having reached the conclusion that no strategic 
economic sector – including industry, logistics, and 
tourism – could develop without educational reform, 
Moroccan governments have put several strategies in 
place over the past two decades. They began devot-
ing a significant portion of public expenditure to 
education: in 2011, these expenditures represented 
6.3 percent of national GDP. By comparison, this indi-
6 Kingdom of Morocco High Commission for Planning, “Morocco between Millennium Development Goals and Sustainable Development Goals: 
Achievements and Challenges,” August 2015 <https://www.hcp.ma/file/174277/> (accessed June 17, 2018).
7 Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS) 2011 Results <https://nces.ed.gov/surveys/pirls/pirls2011.asp> (accessed June 18, 2018).
8 TIMSS, “Résultats des élèves marocains en mathématiques et en sciences dans un contexte international,” 2015 <http://www.csefrs.ma/publications/
timss-2015/?lang=fr> (accessed July 10, 2018), and “Morocco,” Education Policy and Data Center <https://www.epdc.org/country/morocco> (accessed July 
10, 2018).
9 See footnote 8.
10 PIRLS 2011, see footnote 7.
11 “Maroc : près d’un tiers de la population toujours analphabète,” Le Monde Afrique, September 8, 2015 <https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/
article/2015/09/08/maroc-pres-d-un-tiers-de-la-population-toujours-analphabete_4748519_3212.html> (accessed July 10, 2018).
cator was significantly lower during the same period 
for the European Union (5.1 percent), North America 
(5.2 percent), and Latin America (4.7 percent). How-
ever, all indicators show that the Moroccan educa-
tional sector is on the edge of collapse, with four out 
of five students close to illiteracy according to the 
2011 Progress in International Reading Literacy Study 
(PIRLS),7 and between 100,000 and 400,000 students 
quitting school early each year. The challenge today 
therefore is not to inject more cash into the machine, 
but rather to improve the “return on investment” 
rate.
A Deficient Educational System
Despite the several reforms of the past twenty years, 
the quality of Moroccan education has remained 
strikingly deficient, as underlined by several inter-
national studies such as the Trends in International 
Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), the Early 
Grade Reading Assessment (EGRA), or PIRLS.8 The 
Moroccan educational system ranks particularly 
poorly in these studies, even when compared to 
countries with similar economic, social, and demo-
graphic characteristics. In 2011, the PIRLS study 
revealed that 79 percent of Moroccan students’ lit-
eracy was below the low benchmark, meaning that 
four out of five students are close to illiterate. This 
rate was 76 percent in mathematics, meaning that 
three out of four students have no knowledge in this 
field.9 Analysis of primary school students10 high-
lighted their poor performance and the numerous 
dysfunctions of the educational system, including 
inequality between regions, genders, and public and 
private systems, and an increasing number of drop-
outs (400,000 per year).
The weaknesses of the educational system in 
Morocco are also illustrated by the astonishing fig-
ure from the National Agency for the Fight Against 
Illiteracy (ANLCA): approximately 10 million men and 
women are still illiterate, representing 25 percent of 
the Moroccan population.11
The social impact of these realities is dramatic. 
Indeed, educational deficiencies that start at primary 
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school continue throughout the student’s education 
and professional life. In fact, studies have shown that 
the failing educational system directly impacts on the 
unemployment rate (which, in 2010 reached 14.8 per-
cent for those aged 15-34, and 16.7 percent for those 
aged 15-24),12 as well as impacting poverty, illegal 
immigration, delinquency, and extremism.
The Strong Involvement of CSOs in the Educa-
tional Sector
One of the most important stakeholders in the edu-
cational system are civil society organizations (CSOs), 
who mainly focus on three issues. The first is easing 
access to preschool education: in 2015-2016, only 43 
percent of Moroccan children aged four to five were 
enrolled in preschool, with only 27.9 percent enrolled 
in rural areas.13 The Fondation Zakoura Education, 
Al Jisr, Care, and many other NGOs have developed 
various approaches to tackle this issue. Second, 
CSOs work to prevent students from dropping out 
of school: 53 percent of students enrolled in mid-
dle school continue to high school, and less than 15 
percent of first grade students are likely to graduate 
12 Rapport du Conseil Economique et Social, “Emploi des Jeunes,” No. 2, 2011.
13 World Bank, “Early Childhood Education in Morocco: A Critical Window of Opportunities,” September 13, 2017 <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/
feature/2017/09/13/early-childhood-education-in-morocco> (accessed June 17, 2018).
14 “Education”, US AID <https://www.usaid.gov/morocco/education> (accessed June 17, 2018).
15 Samir Chaouki, “Une escroquerie à 43 MMDH,” LesEco, March 30, 2018 <http://leseco.ma/maroc/64977-une-escroquerie-a-43-mmdh.html> (accessed 
July 10, 2018).
from high school.14 Organizations such as Kane Ya 
Makane and Fondation Sanady have developed inno-
vative approaches to keep students in school through 
artistic activities and learning support. Third, CSOs 
propose alternatives to dropping out, where an 
estimated 100,000-400,000 students leave school 
every year, many of whom do so early on and with-
out obtaining qualifications. Specific programs help 
reintegration into school where possible, or provide 
vocational training and work-readiness preparation. 
These programs are run by, among others, L’Heure 
Joyeuse, Al Ikram, and the Fondation Orient-Occi-
dent.
It has long been recognized that while CSOs play 
an important role in development, they have not, to 
date, been significant players in strategic discussions, 
and their views and recommendations are not taken 
into account in public decisions and reforms. The 
experience of the past twenty years has shown how 
many “strategic reforms” by successive Moroccan 
governments, costing billions of dirhams (43 billion, 
according to the Moroccan Court of Auditors15), have 
failed because of numerous deficiencies, including 
















































Source: Aomar Ibourk, “Learning Achievement in Morocco: A Status Assessment,” OCP Policy Center Brief, May 2016.
Figure 1: Morocco’s ranking in reading and mathematics (OCP Policy Center, 2016)
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governance problems, quality of the curricula, and 
lack of educational innovation.16
One of the greatest obstacles commonly reported by 
field operators is the lack of coordination between 
stakeholders, including the Ministry of Education 
(MoE), public schools, NGOs, funding bodies, teach-
ers, students, and families. Unofficially, the MoE 
tends to regard CSOs as competitors or subcontrac-
tors, and rarely as partners who share the same moti-
vations and goals. A further impediment is rooted 
in the wide variety of CSOs and their difficulties in 
creating networks and collectives to act as quali-
fied and recognized partners, making it difficult for 
the MoE to communicate and coordinate with civil 
society. Despite being important actors in Morocco, 
CSOs are relatively young organizations with limited 
human, material, and financial resources. Although 
they play an important role in the field – notably by 
testing innovative approaches – they do not have 
the required organizational, economic, or functional 
resources to share their best practices and replicate 
them on a wider scale.
The following two examples illustrate the difficul-
ties arising from a lack of coordination between 
stakeholders. The Spanish Agency for International 
Development Cooperation (AECID) financed a project 
aimed at capacity-building for various stakeholders 
in education, a significant part of which consisted of 
NGOS providing training to the MoE. This initiative 
was wholly rejected by the Ministry, which led to the 
project’s failure. Second, Atfale, a Moroccan NGO 
specialized in education, put in place a specific pro-
gram dedicated to pre-school education, which was 
to be implemented nationally by the MoE to provide 
various NGOs with a standardized set of pedagogi-
cal tools. This initiative was soon aborted due a lack 
of coordination between the NGOs and the Ministry 
during the program’s elaboration process.
2015-2030 Strategic Vision – Poor Integration of 
CSOs’ Experience
In 2015, the need to implement ambitious educational 
reform – driven by social and economic crisis – led 
the MoE to adopt a new strategic vision proposed 
by the Higher Council for Education, Training, and 
Scientific Research (CSEFRS). The CSEFRS is a con-
sultative body in charge of advising and assessing 
16 Conseil Supérieur de l’Education, de l’Enseignement et de la Recherche Scientifique, “La Mise en œuvre de la charte nationale d’éducation et de 
formation 2000-2013.”
17 Round table “Binatna#1: Rôle de la société civile dans la lutte contre l’abandon scolaire,” organized by the Wassila initiative to understand NGOs’ needs 
and orientations regarding strategic reform 2015-2030.
public policies pertaining to education, training, and 
scientific research. This new vision provides several 
recommendations, including the integration of pre-
school at the primary level, the implementation of 
tutoring, the establishment of libraries, and the revi-
sion of curricula and teaching methods.
Figure 2: The four areas of the strategic 















Source: Ibourk, “Learning Achievement in Morocco,” see endnote iv.
Despite being quite innovative, this strategic vision 
had several flaws. First, the reforms did not suffi-
ciently build on NGOs’ experiences in the educa-
tional field concerning, for example, the fight against 
illiteracy, the need for educational and learning sup-
port, and pre-school education. Second, there were 
no specific mechanisms in place to replicate NGOs’ 
experiences on a wider scale, to compile and analyze 
their achievements, or to highlight best practices. 
Last, there was a lack of support from the Moroccan 
government to help NGOs develop their activities.
During a roundtable meeting in February 2018 on the 
theme of civil society’s role in combatting the school 
dropout rates,17 all NGOs in attendance confirmed 
The MoE tends to regard 
CSOs as competitors or 
subcontractors
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the need to exchange field experiences and lessons 
learnt, so as not to “reinvent the wheel.” They also 
highlighted their frustration at not being able to scale 
up their programs, even when they could provide evi-
dence of their effectiveness.
Recommendations
 - Establish a commission dedicated to the education 
sector
The latest Moroccan constitution of 201118 granted 
civil society a greater role in both local and political 
governance through its involvement in institutional 
decision-making processes. The 2011 constitution 
proposed the creation of an Advisory Council on 
Youth and Associative Action (CCJAA), which would 
oversee the expansion of young people’s and asso-
ciations’ participation in the social, economic, cul-
tural, and political development of the country. This 
Council could specifically work on the educational 
sector under the NGOs’ purview, since it is supposed 
to advise on associative action. A Commission ded-
icated to education and composed of local educa-
tional NGOs could take charge of this mission. To 
succeed, this Commission would have to maintain 
constant communication with the various stake-
holders, implement an objective evaluation process, 
and offer specific assistance or training to NGOs to 
help them document their practices as precisely as 
possible, from the identification of needs to process 
implementation.
 - Implement a participatory approach
For the strategic vision 2015-2030 to reach its 
objectives, a truly participatory approach is neces-
sary. This approach must draw primarily from field 
experience, and mainly from the NGOs, which rep-
resent a critical link in the educational value chain, 
and whose innovative approaches are crucial for 
any ambitious yet realistic reforms. The latter is 
demonstrated by NGOs’ adaptive management, their 
inclusive approach (involving parents, teachers, the 
MoE, other NGOs, and private companies), and their 
focus on project evaluation, which is a prerequisite 
from any fund provider. It is therefore necessary to 
establish an efficient mechanism which would help 
to: identify the best practices implemented by NGOs, 
and share them with the most relevant stakeholders; 
accompany stakeholders in the replication process, 
18 Articles 12 and 33, Morocco’s Constitution of 2011, <https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Morocco_2011.pdf?la ng=en> (accessed July 10, 
2018).
either by NGOs or public authorities (the MoE); and 
evaluate the impact.
Stakeholders must act pragmatically, which means 
that public bodies such as the MoE and schools 
must undergo a change of mentality, especially in 
terms of bureaucracy and decision-making. The var-
ious stakeholders must also undertake all necessary 
efforts to provide the Commission (or the Council) 
with the most relevant information. This means that 
NGOs may need to follow training modules which can 
be put in place and supervised by the above-men-
tioned Commission. The Commission must also build 
on the work of other institutional bodies, such as the 
Economic, Social and Environmental Council (CESE), 
the Council on Higher Education (CSE), and the HCP, 
and try to involve them wherever they can make a 
useful contribution.
Rokaya El Boudrari is an independent consultant 
in Morocco, specialized in CSO management with 
a focus on education and youth employability. She 
has previously held several positions of responsi-
bility in local NGOs.
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IN-SERVICE TEACHER TRAINING IN 
MOROCCO
Khadija Ouadi
While education in Morocco has been subjected to 
several reform strategies since 2000, these attempts 
have yielded few results, and the quality of school-
ing in Morocco has declined to the students’ detri-
ment. Although teachers’ skills can directly impact on 
achievement levels, teachers in Morocco receive rarely 
in-service training to maintain and enhance their 
skills due to financial and organizational obstacles. 
Through the introduction of a decentralized system to 
manage teacher training, in addition to digitalization 
through e-learning, the Ministry of Education could 
ensure regular trainings for all teachers irrespective 
of their workplace, and without affecting the normal 
delivery of courses.
Nelson Mandela once said: “Education is the most 
powerful weapon you can use to change the world.” 
Education can build or destroy a society. Yet despite 
various efforts to create an educational system for 
all, the quality of Moroccan schooling is in question. 
In a 2013-4 UNESCO report on learning and teaching 
quality in 85 countries, Morocco ranked among the 
21 worst educational systems in the world in terms of 
learning.19 These poor results were earlier confirmed 
by the international comparative assessments Trends 
in Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) and Prog-
ress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), 
where in 2011, almost 79 percent of Moroccan stu-
dents in the fourth and sixth grades tested below 
the low benchmark, while this rate was 76 percent 
in mathematics.20 This means that three out of four 
students have difficulties in mathematics and read-
ing. This alarming situation is the result of various 
abnormalities in the educational system.
As cited in a report by the Moroccan Supreme Edu-
cation Council (SEC),21 twenty percent of students 
are taught by teachers who had not received any 
kind of training in the subjects they deliver (mostly 
Arabic, history, geography, physics, chemistry, and 
earth sciences). Moreover, 58 percent of teachers 
spend a great amount of time disciplining pupils at 
the expense of teaching. In addition, sixty percent of 
19 “Teaching and learning: Achieving quality for all,” UNESCO, 2013/4 Education for All Global Monitoring Report <https://en.unesco.org/gem-report/
report/2014/teaching-and-learning-achieving-quality-all> (accessed June 25, 2018).
20 TIMSS & PIRLS International Study Center, TIMSS and PIRLS 2011: Relationships Among Reading, Mathematics, and Science Achievement at the 
Fourth Grade – Implications for Early Learning, edited by Michael O. Martin and Ina V. S. Mullis, <https://timss.bc.edu/timsspirls2011/downloads/TP11_
Relationship_R eport.pdf> (accessed June 25, 2018).
21 Moroccan Supreme Education Council (SEC), Analytical Report: PNEA 2016, p. 9 <http://www.csefrs.ma/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Resume-
Rapport-PNEA-2016-Final.pdf> (accessed July 20, 2018).
teachers had not benefited from any in-service train-
ing during the past five years.
Moroccan education is based on a bureaucratic, cen-
tralized, and concentrated system. Education man-
agement is one way: top-down. Teachers, who rep-
resent the lowest level of the management pyramid, 
are the only ones in direct contact with students, 
while curriculum planning is dictated by the Ministry. 
Inspections are carried out by regional delegations 
according to the Ministry directives. In other words, 
teachers are regarded as the deliverers of a curric-
ulum and pedagogy chosen by the central adminis-
tration and implemented for all students, regardless 
of regional disparities, urban/rural factors, and stu-
dents’ varying levels and ways of understanding.
However, considering the case of Finland, which is 
regarded as having one of the best educational sys-
tems in the world, reveals that one key reason for 
its success is the priority given to teacher training 
and autonomy. This combination of professionalism 
and trust in Finnish education management stands in 
stark contrast to Morocco.
Training and recruitment of teachers in Morocco
Initial teacher training
In Morocco, teacher training is provided by three dif-
ferent institutions: the Regional Pedagogical Centers 
(CPRs), the Ecole Nationale Supérieure (ENS), and 
the Faculty of Education Sciences (FSE). The cur-
rent organization of initial teacher training reveals 
problems essentially linked to institutional overlaps 
and conflicts. For example, the CPRs recruit future 
teachers for preschool, a mission that the FSE also 
Moroccan education is 
based on a bureaucratic 
and centralized system
Chapter II: Morocco‘s Education System
28
REPORT
No. 3 | January 2020 – first published in June 2018
carries out. Moreover, while the CPRs operate under 
the tutelage of the National Ministry of Education, 
the ENS and FSE are supervised by universities. In 
addition, the CPRs and ENS have undergone several 
reforms over the two past decades, in terms of tute-
lage, missions, and selection criteria, which concern 
entry requirements for teachers. These requirements 
continually change from a high school diploma, a 
two-year university degree, to a Bachelor’s degree. 
Besides, teachers at CPRs receive pedagogical train-
ing, while ENS teachers are trained in their field 
according to a BMD (Bachelor’s-Master’s-PHD) sys-
tem. In other words, teachers are trained under sev-
eral systems and with different entry requirements, 
which has led to heterogeneous teacher profiles with 
gaps in the levels of education and diverse training.
Recruitment requirements
The selection process for trainee teachers includes 
a preselection based on a merit order, a test, and an 
interview. This process allows a limited number of 
teachers to be recruited. According to a report by the 
Supreme Court of Audit,22 schools face a shortage of 
teachers, with a 62 percent lack in urban areas (10,318 
teachers) and 38 percent in rural environments (6,382 
teachers). This shortage has also led to the reduc-
tion or even suspension of the teaching of certain 
subjects, or the teaching of courses by non-special-
ized teachers, contract workers, or trainees who are 
insufficiently trained.
In-service training in Morocco
Offering regular in-service trainings to teachers is 
considered to have a positive impact on their con-
duct and practices at the classroom, and also helps 
with the implementation of educational reforms, 
as teachers constitute the interface between edu-
cational management and implementation. The 
national charter of education by the Ministry of Edu-
cation23 states that each education and training offi-
cer, whatever his/her mission or the level at which 
s/he teaches, should benefit from two types of con-
tinuing education and requalification sessions: short 
annual maintenance and skills update sessions, last-
ing around thirty hours, and advanced requalification 
sessions, taking place at least once every three years. 
22 Court of Audit, Référé du Premier président de la Cour des comptes sur les conditions de préparation et de gestion de la rentrée scolaire 2016-2017.
23 See paragraph of 136 “ESPACE IV: RESSOURCES HUMAINES,” National Charter of Education, Ministry of National Education <https://www.men.gov.
ma/Fr/Pages/CNEF_espace4-1.aspx> (accessed July 20, 2018).
24 “Pupil-teacher ratio, primary: Morocco,” World Bank <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.ENRL.TC.ZS?locations=MA&name_
desc=true&view=chart> (accessed July 20, 2018).
25 “Pupil-teacher ratio, primary: European Union,” World Bank <https://donnees.banquemondiale.org/indicateur/SE.PRM.ENRL.TC.Z 
S?locations=EU&view=chart> (accessed July 20, 2018).
However, these requirements concerning the fre-
quency of in-service training are not applied.
Conventional in-service training is rarely held due to 
various reasons. First, Morocco has almost 226,000 
public sector teachers throughout the entire king-
dom. While some work in urban areas and big cit-
ies, others are in rural and enclave areas. Traveling 
to training is difficult and costly to manage, while 
bringing trainers to the teachers’ locations is not a 
viable solution for schools in remote areas with only 
one or two members of staff. Second, according to 
the World Bank, the pupil/teacher ratio averages out 
at 25:8,24 which is high in comparison to other coun-
tries: in 2015, the European Union’s pupil/teacher 
ratio was 13.25 In the absence of trainee replacements, 
the physical absence of teachers attending training 
on schooldays affects students directly. Furthermore, 
in the absence of a compulsory training note from 
the Ministry, teachers do not volunteer for training 
unless it takes place nearby, due to marking commit-
ments, courses preparation, and exhausting work-
ing hours (36 hours per week for primary school 
teachers, and 24 hours per week for college and high 
school teachers). Third, the logistics behind training 
management require the allocation of a considerable 
budget, estimated by the Ministry of Education to be 
€44 million per year, in order to reach the assigned 
goals of the 2015-2030 national strategy.
Recommendations
 - Implement e-learning for teacher training
Distance, time, and budget problems can be effec-
tively reduced with the introduction of e-learning for 
teacher training courses. This scheme would benefit 
not only public sector teachers, but also those in the 
private sector, since the curriculum and its adminis-
tration are almost the same. The starting budget for 
an e-learning solution to serve teachers throughout 
Morocco is €2 million. This budget is calculated as 
follows: No fee for the free, open source Learning 
Management System (LMS); 1,500,000 Moroccan 
Dirham for the installation and personalization of 
the LMS; 200,000 Moroccan Dirham for developing 
e-learning courses; 5,000 Moroccan Dirham for the 
server; 150,000 Moroccan Dirham for maintenance; 
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100,000 for communication and change manage-
ment; and 100,000 Moroccan Dirham for the devel-
opment of a mobile learning extension.
 - Decentralize the management of conventional 
trainings
It is also recommendable to decentralize the man-
agement of conventional trainings to ensure better 
time management and an adjustment of content 
based on regional differences and needs. The Min-
istry of Education’s regional delegations would be 
well suited to ensure the management of in-service 
training, because they have the advantage of prox-
imity, they bring together teachers facing similar 
conditions within a region, and they have qualified 
administrators who can manage the organization of 
in-service training.
The annual planning of in-service training can be 
implemented by the Ministry. Yet, it should include 
facultative training subjects in addition to mandatory 
ones, which each delegation can modify according 
to the needs of schools and teachers of the region 
it manages. Annual reports should be sent to the 
central entity in charge of in-service training, which 
should monitor the in-service trainings and make 
recommendations to continually improve the quality 
and content of delivered trainings.
Khadija Ouadi is an e-learning project manager, 
who works as a knowledge manager for the Trea-
sury General of the Moroccan Kingdom. She is 
also a policy analyst at MENA Policy Hub. She 
holds a BA in Engineering from the School of 
Information Science in Rabat and an MA in Terri-
torial Economics from the University of Moham-
med V.
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LEARNING THROUGH SERIOUS 
GAMING – IMPROVING MOROCCAN 
HIGHER EDUCATION
Benedikt van den Woldenberg
As in many other MENA countries, higher education 
in Morocco is characterized by a strong focus on “chalk 
and talk” methods of instruction. Among other short-
comings,26 this often leads to students rote-learning 
information required for tests rather than developing 
a contextualized understanding of a problem at hand, 
its stakeholders, and their goals and constraints. This 
skill is required across the labor market, from cooper-
ating and negotiating, to navigating frameworks with 
a variety of different institutions at play. The serious 
gaming approach can be used to teach such multi-ac-
tor dynamics and refine the understanding of complex 
issues.
The Moroccan government has identified the educa-
tion system overall – from elementary schools to uni-
versities, from curricula to the quality and quantity 
of teachers – and the gap between taught skills and 
content and labor market demands in particular as 
key areas in which action is required. Several indica-
tors have demonstrated that this skills gap has been 
a significant problem for years. Moroccan youth are 
faced with labor market opportunities insufficient in 
both quantity and quality: the labor force participa-
tion of those aged 15-29 is lower than that of those 
aged 30-64. The overall unemployment rate, gender 
inequalities, and the educational gap all feed into this 
state of affairs.27 Meanwhile, the number of students 
enrolled in tertiary programs has risen dramatically 
from 10.16 percent in 2000 to 28.14 percent in 2015,28 
increasing the pressure on the government to find 
and enact solutions. 
The government thus began implementing an edu-
cational reform program under the auspices of the 
2015-2030 Strategic Vision of Reform, which seeks to 
tackle these issues, defining three key principles for 
improving education: equity and equality of oppor-
tunity, quality for all, and promotion of the individual 
and society. In doing so, the government recognizes 
these principles as interrelated, in particular when 
considering larger challenges: the quality of educa-
tion and the number of years in school are precondi-
26 For a brief overview, see Aourraz, “Rachid: Education Policies in Morocco: Can the Government Fix What It Broke?,” Arab Reform Initiative, October 2017.
27 World Bank, “Kingdom of Morocco. Promoting Youth Opportunities and Participation,” 2012, p. 12.
28 See the World Bank data <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR?end=2015&locat ions=MA&start=1971&view=chart> (accessed June 19, 
2018).
29 For a thorough analysis, see European Training Foundation, “Morocco. Education, Training and Employment Developments 2017,” 2018.
30 See European Commission, “Overview of the Higher Education System: Morocco,” February 2017, pp. 35-36.
tions for the successful integration of youth into the 
country’s labor market, and avoiding high unemploy-
ment in this age group.29
One key target is to improve the ability of educa-
tional institutions and their curricula to match their 
programs to the skills required on the labor market. 
Among the most important, interrelated skills are:
 - Problem-solving skills: employers require workers 
to be able to identify problems, gather the rele-
vant information, and develop possible solutions 
and implement them;
 - Innovation and creativity: a high number of skilled 
positions require the worker to be able to think 
ahead and reflect on established procedures to 
contribute to ongoing improvement;
 - Applying knowledge and skills in real-world set-
tings: the ability to put learned content into prac-
tice is crucial. Rather than relying on predefined 
cases, employees need to be able to extract meth-
ods from case studies in order to be able to apply 
them in various contexts.
The 2015–2030 Strategic Vision of Reform contains 
a total of 23 key levers,30 four of which are directly 
related to the skills listed above:
Lever “Equality 6” Provide education and train-
ing institutions with a level of 
supervision, quality, and equip-
ment, and a capacity for sup-
port in line with the demands 
of fairness and equal opportu-
nities.
Lever “Quality 1” Upgrade the professions of 
teaching, training, and man-
agement: the first precondition 
for any improvement in quality.
Lever “Quality 4” Develop a diversified, open, 
effective, and innovative peda-
gogical model.
Lever “Promotion 1” Match learning and training 
with the needs of the country, 
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the careers of the future, and 
employment capacity.
To date, the implementation of the reforms appears 
to be proceeding apace. The new government, in 
place since April 2017, has merged the two key min-
istries in this field: the Ministry of National Educa-
tion and Vocational Education and Training, and the 
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research. 
Two state secretaries have been appointed, focusing 
on higher education and vocational training respec-
tively. Although a recent reshuffle – the replacements 
in late 2017 of the Minister of Education and the State 
Secretary of Vocational Training – has put a tempo-
rary damper on the overall course of action, it has 
not derailed the reform plans.
Gaming Means Learning
One method that could promote the achievement of 
these four levers is serious gaming, also referred to 
as gamification or simulations. Serious gaming is an 
approach that offers experiential learning. In other 
words, previously acquired theoretical and histori-
cal “textbook” knowledge can be used practically in 
a simulated environment with other students. This 
method directly tackles the four levers of the 2015-
2030 Strategic Vision of Reform named above.
Games always carry aspects of learning. In order to 
perform well in board games like chess, Scrabble, or 
Risk, the player must showcase a set of skills. Knowl-
edge, strategizing, foresight, and interpersonal com-
munication and cooperation are all part of the equa-
tion. Serious gaming can consist of different modes, 
ranging from small scenarios to multi-day simu-
lations.31 Such exercises may include card games, 
board games, or simulations using web-interfaces, 
with numerous possibilities in between. For example, 
in the context of international relations, simulations 
often focus on a specific body (e.g. the UN Security 
Council), a set of actors (the members of said body), 
and a defined topic (e.g. an interstate conflict). The 
most prominent simulation of this kind is arguably 
Model United Nations.
Serious gaming combines the three dimensions 
described below;32 the exact simulation or game used 
can be tailored towards defined learning goals, fac-
tual knowledge, and soft skills.
31 Rex Brynen and Gary Milante, “Peacebuilding With Games and Simulations,” Simulation & Gaming 44 (1:2012), 27-35; Philip Sabin, Simulating War: 
Studying Conflict through Simulation Games (London: Continuum, 2012); Ulrich Mans, Gideon Shimshon and Leonard Suransky, “Training the Warrior-
Diplomat: Enhancing negotiation and conflict management skills through experiential learning,” International Negotiation 15 (2010), pp. 247-280.
32 Dimitrios Vlachopoulos and Agoritsa Makri, “The effect of games and simulations on higher education: a systematic literature review,” International 
Journal of Educational Technology in Higher Education 14 (22:2017).
 - Cognitive: gaming can improve participants’ fac-
tual and contextual understanding of the matter 
at hand;
 - Behavioral: participants enhance their soft skills, 
such as public speaking, negotiating, finding com-
promises, working in teams, time management, 
and being able to properly prioritize;
 - Affective: by immersing themselves in the exer-
cise, participants are exposed to a much more 
realistic depiction of specific situations they might 
encounter in their professional careers.
Across disciplines, it is crucial to develop a close 
understanding of multi-actor environments and 
decision-making processes, as well as the overall 
skills of collaborative problem-solving and contextu-
alizing knowledge and methods. The skill sets taught 
at university level need to include these components 
to prepare students for the labor market, and allow 
them to match their skills necessary for a successful 
career.
Students who participated in simulations stressed 
time and again that the experience was crucial to 
their later professional success. Being able to put 
acquired factual knowledge into action in an arena 
where mistakes have no real-life consequences has 
proven highly useful. When evaluating simulations, 
participants regularly emphasize that they gained a 
much deeper understanding of the complexity of the 
issue discussed, and the vast majority would recom-
mend taking part in such an exercise to their peers.
Recommendations
 - Embed serious gaming in curricula
Serious gaming can help Morocco meet the chal-
lenges as described above. Ideally, gaming elements 
would be included in regular course schedules 
towards the end of Bachelor’s and Master’s pro-
grams. Class sizes should be no larger than thirty 
students, and participation should be mandatory. 
There are two reasons for this: first, placing gaming 
on the curriculum establishes it as an essential ele-
ment of education, rather than a one-off or sporadic 
practice. Second, if such an exercise were voluntary, 
with potential extra costs and time commitments, 
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participation would most likely be uneven, due to the 
discriminatory effects of various personal circum-
stances.
Figure 1: Including serious gaming into a 
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A semester in Morocco typically spans sixteen weeks, 
comprises three modules, and includes at least 360 
hours of course work. Usually, the most productive 
and targeted approach to serious gaming is to offer 
a regular course on the topic introduced throughout 
a semester, which finishes with a simulation. This 
ensures that students are sufficiently familiar with 
gaming and can engage with it properly. However, 
simulations may also make sense at the beginning or 
during the semester or module, if the goal is to high-
light the complexity of an issue, with a subsequent 
class session to clarify.
While mandatory, students’ participation and perfor-
mance should not be directly linked to grading. That 
is, a certain outcome, such as achieving a predefined 
goal, is not only difficult to assess, but also has a neg-
ative impact on the overall flow of a serious gaming 
exercise and the experience of participants.
 - Introduce serious gaming as method: training 
teachers
The serious gaming approach can successfully be 
introduced to lecturers and academic staff at Moroc-
can universities by training teachers on-site to create 
multipliers and reach as many students as possible 
in a relatively short amount of time. Such trainings 
should follow the “no one size fits all” approach, 
where the emphasis is on the method rather than 
a prepared simulation. Teachers should receive a 
customizable toolkit, reflecting the focus on multi-
ple, repeatable forms or opportunities. This can be 
achieved either by running a one- or (preferably) 
two-day workshop, depending on teachers’ familiar-
ity with the method. The workshop should address 
how to create a tailored simulation, and the neces-
sary technical and logistical points to consider. Such 
workshops should touch on at least four aspects cru-
cial to their success: the need for thorough prepa-
ration; an introduction of the actual content; the 
simulation itself and all its logistical aspects; and an 
interactive and comprehensive debriefing and eval-
uation.
 - Enhance external support and cooperation
As serious gaming is part of some – albeit too few 
– curricula at German universities, external experi-
ence can be provided. Enhancing Moroccan higher 
education is primarily a domestic effort, yet exter-
nal partners such as Germany can nevertheless play 
a constructive role within the framework of wider 
educational cooperation projects:
The German Academic Exchange Service’s Ger-
man-Arab Transformation Partnership should 
include more improved teaching methods, including 
serious gaming, in its development and funding for 
educational cooperation. It should suggest or incen-
tivize the integration of serious gaming into any cur-
ricula of joint degree programs, for example.
The Federal Ministry of Education and Research 
should expand its activities with Morocco, adding 
programs for educational cooperation in addition 
to the existing research-focused ones. The Minis-
try should also foster projects with Morocco in the 
area of Education and Institutions of Higher Learn-
ing, as it does with Tunisian partners. Serious gaming 
should be a focus of this.
The budget for cultural relations and education pol-
icy (AKBP, financed mostly by the Foreign Office 
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and the Ministry of Education and Research) has 
increased continuously over recent years, and stood 
at €1,767 billion in 2016, an increase of sixteen per-
cent since 2010.33 The CDU-SPD “grand coalition” has 
stated in its coalition agreement that this trend is to 
continue, offering the possibility of enhanced coop-
eration between Germany and Morocco in the field 
of higher education, involving serious gaming. Some 
of these funds should be used to finance educational 
cooperation programs that foster the provision of 
serious gaming to teachers at Moroccan universities.
Benedikt van den Woldenberg works at the Ger-
man Orient-Institute in Berlin, where he is the 
Co-Head of the Editorial Office of the Institute’s 
quarterly journal Orient and is a member of the 
think tank Polis180. He has a wide array of inter-
ests related to political reform processes as well 
as geopolitical dynamics and in German foreign 
policy toward the MENA region. He has a passion 
for serious gaming and the manifold opportuni-
ties it offers.
33 Helmut K. Anheier, “Die Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik Deutschlands im internationalen Vergleich. Zwischenbericht,” July 2017, p. 2.
Chapter II: Morocco‘s Education System
34
REPORT
No. 3 | January 2020 – first published in June 2018
THE ROLE OF EXTRACURRICULAR 
ACTIVITIES IN PREVENTING 
IRREGULAR MIGRATION AND 
YOUTH RADICALIZATION
Richard Grieco
The Moroccan government faces great challenges 
from young people’s clandestine migration to Europe 
and the risk of radicalization they constantly face due 
to societal weaknesses, from widespread illiteracy to 
unemployment. To implement effective policies to 
tackle these two phenomena, three activities devel-
oped by the Italian NGO Progettomondo.mlal over sev-
eral projects can serve as best practices. They include 
extra-curricular creativity and socialization activities 
to stimulate the students, and scholastic modules on 
self-esteem, anger management, and citizenship edu-
cation to reduce the risk of radicalization. A broader 
(and possibly national) use of similar approaches 
would support young people by making them realize 
their value, and by clarifying the risks that irregular 
migration and radicalization constitute to their lives 
and broader society.
Moroccan social reality has been undergoing 
immense change. The country has been a land of 
emigration and transit – mostly for sub-Saharan 
migrants – for decades, but has now also become a 
land of final destination. Its geographical position, 
the 2008 global economic crisis, and the recent 
tightening of European migration policies are among 
the reasons behind this change. Morocco is there-
fore currently facing several issues not dissimilar to 
those experienced by European countries. Irregular 
migrants can face violence from national security 
forces and legal impediments due to the country’s 
delayed adoption of refugee status laws.34 Emigration 
remains central in the country’s political and social 
discourse too, in terms of migrants’ remittances, for 
example, and the challenges faced by the diaspora in 
Europe. Morocco also has to confront the re-integra-
tion of returnees, high levels of unemployment and 
illiteracy, young people’s detachment from society, 
and the radicalization path that some of them fol-
34 Amnesty International, “Maroc et Sahara Occidental 2017/2018” <https://www.amnesty.org/fr/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/morocco/
report-morocco> (accessed June 20, 2018).
35 Lahcen Aalla and Marina Lovato, Étude psychosociale sur le phénomène de la radicalisation des jeunes (Béni Mellal, 2017), p. 108.
36 Haut-Commissariat au Plan (HCP), Direction Régionale du Plan Béni Mellal-Khénifra, “La migration internationale au Maroc – cas de la région de Tadla-
Azilal” <https://www.hcp.ma/region-drta/La-migration-internationale-au-Maroc-cas-de-la-region-de-Tadla-Azilal_a60.html> (accessed June 20, 2018).
37 Bureau Méditerranéen des Hautes Etudes de Gestion de Ressources, Etude sur le phénomène migratoire des mineurs non accompagnés dans les 
provinces de Tanger, Nador, Béni Mellal et Khouribga, 2012, pp. 8-10.
38 HCP, “La migration international au Maroc,” see endnote iii; and HCP, “Taux d’accroissement de la population du Maroc (en percent) par période et milieu 
de résidence: 1960-2050”<https://www.hcp.ma/Taux-d-accroissement-de-la-population-du-Maroc-en-par-periode-et-milieu-de-residence-1960-2050_
a683.html> (accessed January 1, 2018).
low. Indeed, more than 2,000 young Moroccans have 
joined terrorist movements in the last few years, and 
45 percent of young people admit to having visited 
jihadist-inspired websites.35
The Root Causes and Extent of Migration and Radi-
calization in Morocco
Morocco has recently experienced rapid economic 
and social change. The effects of the changes it has 
undergone – and to some extent is still undergoing – 
can be easily seen in the region of Béni Mellal-Khén-
ifra, which has the highest rate of migrants leaving 
for Europe, and exemplifies the phenomenon of rapid 
urbanization taking place all over the country. The 
region has always been among the poorest areas of 
Morocco, causing thousands of men and women to 
leave for the city of Béni Mellal from surrounding 
rural areas.36 Urbanization created a new series of 
social issues, which led to international emigration. 
The flows are representative of Moroccan migra-
tion, which began in the 1950s and 1960s, with a cir-
cular migration that would supply Europe with the 
workforce it required. During the 1970s and 1980s, 
migrants’ families started leaving Morocco to reunite 
in Europe, causing migration to become permanent. 
After the Schengen Treaty came into force, and the 
European Union as we know it today was created, 
migration became mostly irregular, causing polit-
ical issues within the Union itself and enormously 
increasing the risks migrants faced in reaching 
Europe.37 The demography of Morocco and the region 
in general was highly affected by such flows, which 
impacted population growth rates. For example, from 
1994-2004, the population growth rate of Béni Mellal 
was 0.9 percent, while the national growth rate was 
1.6 percent.38
Such internal and transnational changes have pro-
duced another effect: migrants now not only come 
from disadvantaged rural areas, but also from the 
middle class. Driven by feelings of precariousness 
and uncertainty, and the lack of future professional 
and social opportunities, educated young people look 
for opportunities abroad.
Chapter II: Morocco‘s Education System
35No. 3 | January 2020 – first published in June 2018
REPORT
A 2007 academic research, developed in collabora-
tion with the University of Mohammedia and based 
on a representative sample of youth in Béni Mellal, 
has shown that the desire to migrate develops during 
preadolescence (that is, between the ages 10-12). 
Around seventy percent of the young people inter-
viewed declared that their aim in life was indeed to 
migrate, even if that meant irregular migration. The 
interviews revealed an in-depth knowledge of irreg-
ular migration channels, and a lack of knowledge of 
legal migration or locally available opportunities.39
The subject of migration has been, and partially 
remains, a taboo in Morocco, relegated to the pri-
vate sphere, in which relatives’ stories and desire 
for personal and social emancipation depended on 
a distorted perception of European cultural val-
ues and lifestyles. Therefore, younger generations 
approach the subject without sufficient knowledge 
or the capacity to critically analyze the risks and dis-
advantages of such a choice. The risks include being 
trafficked, arrested, deported, and finding a reality 
in the destination country that does not match up 
to ideals created in childhood. This distorted image 
of migration has spread at both the “popular” and 
institutional levels, leading to public bodies working 
on social issues or political programs for young peo-
ple lacking information on irregular migration, and 
showing the ordeals that clandestine migrants, and 
especially minors, have to endure to enter the EU.40
In addition to the desire for personal and profes-
sional realization abroad, other factors explain young 
people’s aspiration to emigrate: perceived exclusion 
from the community, high unemployment, a lack of 
professional organizations, and poor conditions in 
the job market.41 Thinking of themselves as losers, 
young people start seeking different forms of per-
sonal realization that can help sedate their feelings 
of frustration and exclusion. The difficulties encoun-
tered in realizing their life goals, together with the 
lack of alternatives, feed their sense of desperation 
and failure, which can easily be channeled into hate 
and anger. Extremist groups exploit these feelings 
and use them to make young people feel significant 
by becoming part of a bigger “plan” and of a commu-
nity. Paradoxically they treat them as heroes when 
they follow directions.42
39 Baccali, “La migration marocaine.”
40 Progettomondo.mlal, “Le phénomène des migrations irrégulières des mineurs dans la Tadla-Azilal,” Bureau Méditerranéen des Hautes Études de Gestion 
des Ressources, 2013.
41 Karim Baccali, “La migration marocaine en Europe: causes et défis,” Progettomondo.mlal, 2013.
42 Lahcen Aalla, Marina Lovato, Paola Chianca, Mustapha Yakoubi, “Radicalisme non merci – Parcours Educatif,” 2017 <https://www.noradicalism.amnesty.
ma/> (accessed July 10, 2018).
43 Aalla and Lovato, Étude psychosociale, p. 108.
Exposure to the Risk of Radicalization
The 2017 study conducted by Lahcen Aalla and 
Marina Lovato using a sample of 93 young people 
showed a concrete risk of radicalization due to a lack 
of educational structures that promote social inte-
gration, freedom of communication, and expression. 
The researchers selected the sample from the areas 
of Rabat-Salé, Khouribga, and the region of Béni Mel-
lal-Khénifra, to examine religious radicalization and 
possible ways in which youth are radicalized. The 
vast majority of the sample presented a fairly high 
level of education: 65 percent were attending uni-
versity, and ten percent were in high school. One 
of the most interesting findings was a progressive 
detachment from the family unit as a moral and reli-
gious point of reference. The interviewees reported 
relying on teachers and educators, or on the internet 
(rather than their families) to discuss and understand 
contemporary social, political, and religious issues. 
When asked whether they had ever consulted a 
jihadist website, 45 percent said yes, of whom 84 per-
cent said it was out of curiosity, nine percent wanted 
to discover the “true religion,” and seven percent 
wanted to discover their personal path.43
This data is alarming, especially when considering 
that similar studies conducted in Europe reported 
that people recruited via the internet had initially 
accessed jihadist websites out of curiosity. Moreover, 
the study illustrates the perceived lack of educational 
prospects, and great concern for the future, not only 
in terms of acquiring financial independence, but also 
of satisfying the need for social engagement. Despite 
their desire for interaction, numerous respon-
dents admitted to perceiving the social and cultural 
diversity of foreigners as a threat to the integrity of 
There is a lack of knowl-
edge of legal migration and 
local opportunities
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Moroccan moral and religious customs.44 This data is 
of great importance, as it may indicate an increase in 
the levels of intolerance and racism in the country.
The study demonstrated that poverty does not deter-
mine radicalization by itself, but together with a lack 
of educational and employment opportunities, and 
social protection shortcomings, poverty can cer-
tainly lead young people down this path. It is crucial 
to highlight the fact that both migration and radical-
ization originate from the same social weaknesses, 
although there is no single, linear reaction to the 
challenges that Moroccan youth face. Working on 
these societal root causes as well as on individual and 
psychosocial needs has proved to be a useful tool in 
preventing both phenomena.
Best Practices and Lessons Learned from Proget-
tomondo.mlal
Progettomondo.mlal is an Italian NGO, established 
in 1966 and operating in Morocco since 2001, ini-
tially only in the region of Béni Mellal-Khénifra (at 
that time Tadla-Azilal). On the international level, it 
promotes human rights by focusing on sustainable 
development, the correct functioning of the justice 
system, responsible migration towards Europe, and 
global education. In Morocco, it focuses on women’s 
and children’s rights, literacy, and access to educa-
tion. Over the last few years, it has started specializ-
ing in the prevention of radicalization and the inte-
gration of returning migrants, including those from 
sub-Saharan countries.
In order to address the country’s educational weak-
nesses, the Moroccan Ministry of Education imple-
mented a Plan d’Urgence (Urgency Plan) in 2009. The 
Plan encouraged the establishment of school clubs, 
developed by volunteer teachers to monitor existing 
44 Ibid, p. 114.
educational needs and then elaborate extracurricu-
lar activities accordingly, by promoting young peo-
ple’s active citizenship. With time, each club began 
focusing on specific issues, such as human rights, 
environmental protection, and health issues. Given 
Progettomondo.mlal’s experience in these areas, and 
the opportunity school clubs represented to improve 
the Moroccan educational system, the NGO pro-
moted several related actions. Specifically, teachers 
managing the human rights-focused school clubs 
were selected to collaborate with the NGO to prevent 
irregular migration.
The Educational Curriculum on Migration and 
Radicalization
In the context of the project “Enfants en voyage,” a 
Pedagogical Unit (PU) composed of European and 
Moroccan education, psychology, and psycho-ped-
agogy professionals developed an educational cur-
riculum on migration and radicalization. Divided into 
different sections, the curriculum promotes stu-
dents’ integration into Moroccan society, improves 
their knowledge of contemporary debates, and pro-
vides them with an array of legal channels and local 
alternatives that could contribute to the reduction 
of clandestine and child migration. The curriculum’s 
success among students, partners, and institutions 
encouraged Progettomondo.mlal to adapt it for reuse 
in several current projects, including “Radicalisme: 
non merci,” a pilot project to prevent radicalization 
through innovative services, such as youth mentor-
ing, and intercultural dialogue.
The curriculum includes sessions on aspects of the 
self. Participants’ personalities and identities are 
valorized to reinforce their self-esteem and develop 
their empathy. Given that these personality traits 
also facilitate the management of inter- and intra-
personal tensions, specific attention is devoted to 
the management of emotions, and especially anger 
management, which is of vital importance in the fight 
against radicalization. Application of the curriculum 
has shown that to properly address radicalization, 
citizenship education and cohabitation must also be 
included. Participants must fully understand group 
dynamics to recognize when these are transformed 
into a form of control over the individual. In such a 
situation, the feeling of being integrated into a group 
ceases to act as leverage for personal development, 
and is instead transformed into a cage in which indi-
viduals’ subjectivity is absent.
Migration and 
 radicalization  originate 
from the same social 
 weaknesses
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The development of the “self” is combined with active 
work on migration. This includes informational ses-
sions, such as on the risks of irregular migration, as 
well as activities focused on reconstructing rela-
tionships between the students and their reality 
of belonging: family, community, and local institu-
tions. The goal is for adolescents and young people 
to develop the ability to critically analyze their own 
migration plan in the light of a full understanding of 
the opportunities that Morocco offers. Any curricu-
lum aimed at preventing irregular migration needs to 
encourage a critical analysis of the migratory desire 
by providing a balanced perception of current life 
plans and available alternatives, and channeling the 
idea that realization in one’s own country does not 
need to be perceived as a form of personal failure.
Training Animators and Teachers
The Pedagogical Unit also led an innovative training 
for animators and teachers, in which participants 
tested first-hand the educational program and activ-
ities they would later pass on to students. The train-
ing focused on developing and strengthening specific 
skills, and included relevant theoretical knowledge 
of migration, especially in relation to young people, 
and a section on revisiting, renewing, and sharing 
good educational practices through group-work and 
workshops. Participants were taught inter-gener-
ational communication techniques and to promote 
encouraging attitudes, laying the ground for a pos-
itive relationship with students based on trust and 
understanding.
The Media Library
The project “Enfants en voyage” supported the cre-
ation of a dedicated environment in the form of a 
media library, which allowed young people to join 
activities that develop their creativity and social 
skills. Students aged 12-19 were free to debate several 
topics, including minors’ migration, and could share 
their dreams and ambitions with trained animators. 
The educational program comprised a three-level 
strategy of action:
 - individual: working on students’ self-esteem, the 
acceptance of differences, and self-perception in 
a group dynamic;
 - collective: encouraging group work and the 
acceptance of related norms; and
45 Baccali, “La migration marocaine.”
46 Proyectos SIWA SL, “Evaluation externe finale du projet «Enfants en voyage: pour une approche responsable des mineurs»,” 2014.
 - social: considering public spaces as interesting 
and dynamic environments.
The general objective was for the animator to be 
perceived not as an authority figure, but as a facil-
itator who could encourage interventions and stim-
ulate confrontation. This represented an innovative 
approach, given that migration has long been con-
sidered extremely sensitive in both the private and 
educational spheres. This approach allowed students 
to express their opinions and participate with ease. 
The animators and teachers also ran information and 
counseling desks on legal migration and alternatives 
to migration, where students could discuss their aspi-
rations and receive advice on the best way to realize 
them. Such desks also provided practical information 
on the bureaucratic procedures necessary for those 
who wanted to emigrate legally (including study or 
work visas, contacts with embassies, and so on), and 
offered concrete help in filling out forms.45
The social animation activities developed in the 
media libraries proved extremely useful. They 
included role play, theater and art classes, group 
exercises, debates, movie screenings, and presenta-
tions. The project reached thousands of people, with 
more than 64,000 adolescents making use of the 97 
media libraries over 28 months. More than 2,500 
adolescents benefited from the new educational cur-
riculum. A project evaluation reported that eighty 
percent of participants could answer most of the 
questions on minor migration and its risks correctly, 
while all respondents viewed the activities as inspir-
ing and important. More than fifty animators and 300 
teachers were trained in the curriculum, and school 
club and counselling desk management. Moroccan 
institutions and educational associations also evalu-
ated the experience positively, and were keen to con-
tinue. Finally, the project’s outreach influenced and 
inspired even greater numbers than those directly 
involved46 – including three events, eight contests, 
100 podcasts and thirteen reportages – raising the 
visibility not only of the project itself, but also the 
issues at stake.
Recommendations
 - Use social-proximity tools
Social-proximity tools and activities implemented 
“in the field” and aimed at young people can induce 
positive behavioral changes and have a long-lasting 
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impact on the country’s social and economic condi-
tions. Extending such tools at the national level, for 
example by making use of the existing 1,000+ schools 
clubs, would amplify the positive effects they have 
had in Progettomondo.mlal’s past projects.
 - Introduce an educational curriculum on migration 
and radicalization
Activities that address young people’s self-esteem, 
their emotions, and personal values, as well as pro-
viding practical information on migration-related 
opportunities and dangers, have proved to be effec-
tive and highly appreciated. Social and educational 
change can be based on similar combinations of 
psychological assistance with information sessions. 
Moreover, integrating extracurricular activities into 
the education program has proven important in pre-
venting students from dropping out of school.47
 - Foster active collaboration between civil society, 
public, and private actors
Marginalized individuals and groups must receive 
support to prevent them from making dangerous 
choices, such as adhering to extremist ideologies 
or leaving the country without first comprehending 
the risks. The complicated interlinkage of societal 
and economic issues that spark irregular migration 
and radicalization requires the active collaboration 
of civil society, public, and private actors to prevent 
further crisis and alleviate a difficult social situation.
Richard Grieco has been working as a project 
manager and country representative for the 
Italian NGO Progettomondo.mlal in Béni Mellal 
(Morocco) since 2014. He is currently managing 
the projects “Radicalisme, non merci,” funded by 
the EU, and “Je suis migrant,” funded by the Italian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From 2006-2014, he 
worked for various Italian NGOS in Burkina Faso, 
Niger, the Central African Republic, and the Dem-
ocratic Republic of Congo. He holds a BA and an 
MA in International and Diplomatic Sciences from 
the Political Science Department of the University 
of Turin.
47 Progettomondo.mlal, “Le phénomène des migrations irrégulières.”
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MOROCCAN MIGRATION POLICY – 
EDUCATION AS A TOOL TO 
PROMOTE THE INTEGRATION OF 
SUB-SAHARAN MIGRANTS
Mohammed Ouhemmou
In 2014, Morocco initiated a legalization campaign 
aimed at regulating the status of thousands of irregular 
Sub-Saharan migrants. Pioneered at the regional level, 
it marked a historic shift from a security-driven to a 
human rights-based approach to migration. The offi-
cial discourse accompanying the policy announcement 
posited integration as a major objective. Government 
officials repeatedly stated that the policy sought to 
regulate the status of migrants, and to develop mech-
anisms to promote their integration and socio-eco-
nomic mobility. However, in practice, the new policy 
lacks practical policy instruments that can facilitate 
integration. In order to tackle these issues, a number 
of steps should be taken, such as the provision of lan-
guage support programs for migrant students, and 
channels to facilitate communication between parents 
and educators; the establishment of additional fund-
ing mechanisms to finance independent educational 
and cultural support programs; the implementation 
of in-service training programs to enable teachers to 
cater to the specific needs of migrants; the revision of 
textbook content in terms of racial and cultural sensi-
tivity; and the provision of necessary means to encour-
age the work of school clubs and other activities that 
can promote contact and communication between 
native and migrant students.
In 2013, Morocco announced a new migration policy. 
In a joint communiqué released by the Ministry of the 
Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Min-
istry of Justice, the King called for a “new vision for a 
national migration policy that is humanist in its phi-
losophy, responsible in its approach, and pioneering 
at the regional level.”1 This statement marked an end 
to the security-based policy adopted in the 1990s. It 
also came after Morocco was subjected to intense 
international criticism over its treatment of Sub-Sa-
haran migrants. Moreover, the National Council for 
Human Rights (CNDH) also issued a brief report, in 
which it recommended that the government “estab-
lish a policy of integrating said refugees and their 
1 “Migration: Royal Instructions Bring a New Vision for a National and Humanist Migration Policy (Release),” Kingdom of Morocco Ministry of Culture and 
Communication, September 12, 2013 <http://www.maroc.ma/en/news/migration-royal-instructions-bring-new-vision-national-and-humanist-migration-
policy-release> (accessed June 30, 2018).
2 National Council for Human Rights (CNDH), “Thematic Report on the Situation of Migrants and Refugees in Morocco: Foreigner and Human Rights in 
Morocco. For a Radically New Asylum and Migration Policy,” Rabat, 2013.
3 “The National Strategy on Migration and Asylum,” Minister in Charge of Moroccans Resident Abroad and Migration Affairs, Rabat, 2014.
4 “On the Integration of Foreign Pupils Originating from the Countries of the Sahel and Sub-Sahara in the Moroccan Educational System,” Ministry of 
National Education, Reference no. 13-487), Rabat, October 9, 2017.
families in terms of housing, health, schooling, train-
ing, and employment.”2
By 2014, the country had launched a large-scale 
documentation campaign with which the govern-
ment sought to “legalize” the status of thousands of 
migrants by granting them residence cards. In late 
2014, the country adopted its National Strategy for 
Migration and Asylum, which the Ministry of Migra-
tion has described as a “humanitarian and compre-
hensive policy.”3 The new national integration policy 
seeks to promote the integration of migrants using a 
set of tools, at the apex of which is education.
Access to Education: Pre- and Post-2013 Policy 
Reform
Prior to the launch of the National Migration and 
Integration Policy in 2013, the access of Sub-Saharan 
children to Moroccan schools was governed by the 
ministerial circular N77 (issued in 1996, and modified 
in 2005). According to this circular, children wishing 
to register needed to provide a list of documents, 
including a birth certificate, and documents demon-
strating their educational record. Yet this proved 
challenging for many undocumented children, and 
for the children of refugees and asylum seekers 
unable to provide such documents. In 2013, the Min-
istry of Education issued a new circular, No. 13-487, 
on the access of migrant students to the country’s 
educational system. It mentioned specifically the 
“integration of foreign pupils originating from the 
countries of the Sahel and Sub-Sahara in the Moroc-
can educational system,”4 thus marking a radical shift 
from the old discourse that did not recognize educa-
tional integration as an issue. Most importantly, the 
new circular has limited the bureaucratic and admin-
istrative obstacles that have long prevented migrants 
from accessing education. Parents wishing to regis-
ter their children need to show no more than basic 
documents, such as an identity card, documents 
demonstrating any previous educational record, and 
a copy of the residence card, if available.
This 2013 ministerial circular represents a leap for-
ward in facilitating the access of migrants, and more 
specifically Sub-Saharan migrants, to the Moroccan 
educational system. However, other persistent prob-
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lems have remained unaddressed, which hinder the 
advancement and educational attainment of Sub-Sa-
haran migrants and consequently their integration 
into the country’s social structure. These problems 
include the languages of instruction, and inadequate 
teacher training whereby teachers cannot cater for 
the specific needs of migrant students, all exacer-
bated by the lack of pre-school programs.
Languages Spoken at Home, and Their Impact on 
Integration at School
Language difficulties also play a major role in hin-
dering the involvement of parents in school life and 
following the progress of their children. However, 
migrant parents still show higher rates of involve-
ment in their children’s education than native ones. 
Language problems limit migrant parents’ access to 
the educational system in the same way they also 
prevent access to other services, such as health care. 
The National AIDS Control Program and the National 
Institute of Hygiene of the Ministry of Health noted 
in a survey that due to communication difficulties, 
most Sub-Saharan migrants seek medical treatment 
via private doctors and NGOs instead of public insti-
tutions.5
Sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco come from various 
countries and different socioeconomic backgrounds, 
and speak a wide array of languages. Major distinc-
tions exist between Francophones from countries 
such as Mali, Senegal, and Burkina Faso, and Anglo-
phone migrants from Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leon, 
and the Gambia. However, neither group is homoge-
nous. They include people with different mother 
tongues, including Igbo, Hausa, Bambara, Songhai, 
Wolof, and many others.
A child’s first exposure to language is with the mother. 
Although most Sub-Saharan women are active eco-
nomically, and are highly creative in making their liv-
ing, their command of Darija (the Moroccan dialect) is 
limited. Moreover, the fact that migrants live together 
in densely-concentrated residential areas means that 
they have limited contact with natives, and extended 
contact with fellow migrants. In fact, some migrants 
make their living exclusively through contact with 
other migrants. Migrants’ entrepreneurial activities 
5 Cited in A. Chang, Politics of Health: The 2013 Integration Policy’s Effect on Immigrant Access to Care, unpublished independent study, 2014.
6 Lasting from the 1990s in response to EU pressure to curb irregular migration, this approach was given further legitimacy in 2003 by the adoption 
of Law 02.03 regulating the entry and stay of foreigners. It was characterized by summary arrest and mass deportation campaigns against irregular Sub-
Saharan migrants, and forced many migrants to limit their contact with natives and concentrate themselves in specific neighborhoods within cities, therefore 
limiting the prospects of spatial integration.
7 See N. Wilson, Impact of Extracurricular Activities on Students, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Stout (2009); K. Kuhar and J. 
Sabljić, “The Work and Role of Extracurricular Clubs in Fostering Student Creativity,” Journal of Education and Training Studies 4 (2016), pp. 93-104; and E. 
Massoni, “Positive Effects of Extra Curricular Activities on Students,” ESSAI 9 (2011).
are limited not only by the lack of business skills and 
difficulties in accessing financial resources, but also 
for historical reasons dating back to the era when 
the government adopted highly restrictive detention 
and deportation polices against irregular migrants, 
a period often labeled in media reports somewhat 
exaggeratedly as the “war against migrants.”6
Although children acquire basic language skills 
through their daily contact with native children out-
side the school context, such interactions depend on 
each family’s particular conditions, including social 
status, place of living, and income levels. Migrant 
children thus enter a vicious circle where limited 
contact leads to low command of the language. The 
latter leads to social isolation and finally contributes 
to and perpetuates limited language competence. It 
may even render these children anxious and stressed, 
which can contribute to behavioral problems and 
lower achievement. In the early 2000s, the Ministry 
of National Education initiated some very efficient 
measures relating to extra-curricular activities – 
circulars N167 and N42 – long before migration and 
integration became hot topics in the country. Yet 
they can also be applied to migrant students.
Circular N42 promotes active school life, and encour-
ages the establishment of clubs within school. Such 
measures have promoted good learning and interac-
tion between students, and reduced behavioral prob-
lems.7 Indeed, some skills, such as communication, 
socialization, team working, and networking, cannot 
be learned in the classroom. In fact, extra-curricular 
activities and school clubs have other benefits not 
Some migrants make 
their living exclusively 
through contact with other 
migrants
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exclusively related to immigrants, such as a decrease 
in behavioral problems.
Empirical research shows that students who do not 
speak the language of the host country perform less 
well than those who do.8 Studies also demonstrate 
that contact with native peers is often the fastest 
way to learn the host language. In other words, lack 
of contact undermines language and communica-
tion skills, and in turn, limited communication skills 
can undermine contact. In many cases, the lack of 
contact is grounded in negative and discriminatory 
social perceptions. Consequently, initiatives from the 
Ministry of National Education, such as the “national 
competition on migration,” represent a positive con-
tribution.
This “national competition on migration” is organized 
in collaboration between the Ministry of National 
Education, the Ministry of Migration, and the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, and aims to “highlight values of 
persistence and positive competition and encourage 
diversity, cross-cultural exchange, coexistence, and 
acceptance of others. It also seeks to raise aware-
ness about the issues of migrants and migration 
among learners.”9 Accordingly, students are invited 
to produce written works, paintings, and short films 
about migration issues. This is a practice that should 
be promoted and funded to further stimulate con-
tact and establish commonalities between migrant 
and native students. However, two factors are lack-
ing that limit the success of the initiative: logistical 
support, and information and communication within 
8 Jan C. van Ours, Yuxin Yao and Asako Ohinata, “The Educational Consequences of Language Proficiency for Young Children,” CEPR Discussion Paper 
no. DP11183, March 2016; and Suet-ling Pong and Nancy S. Landale, “Academic Achievement of Legal Immigrants’ Children: The Roles of Parents’ Pre- and 
Post-migration Characteristics in Origin-Group Differences,” Child Development 5 (2012), pp. 1543–1559.
9 “On the Organization of the National Competition on Migration,” Ministry of National Education, Reference no. 120X17), Rabat, December 14, 2017.
10 F. Laroui, Le Drame Linguistique Marocain (Zellige Editions, 2011).
schools. These two problems must be addressed to 
guarantee the continuity and success of the initiative.
The Language(s) of Instruction and Educational 
Attainment
Various studies, such as Laroui’s Le Drame Linguis-
tique Marocain, recognize that Morocco’s linguistic 
problem is grounded in diglossia and the subsequent 
use of different languages and language varieties 
across different educational levels.10 For instance, 
from primary to high school, most classes are taught 
in a mix of Standard Arabic and Moroccan dialect. 
Yet an abrupt change takes place in higher education 
where many disciplines are taught not in Arabic, but 
rather in French. Consequently, students may fail to 
make the transition, which in turn contributes to the 
high drop-out rates at the country’s universities. In 
brief, the linguistic situation in Morocco is so com-
plex that even many natives cannot cope. It is cer-
tainly more difficult for non-francophone migrants, 
and this requires extra language support.
Sub-Saharan children face a particularly challenging 
and confusing situation in which one language is spo-
ken at home, another one in the street, and two more 
at school. The language of instruction and the need to 
cater for the special needs of migrants become more 
problematic at advanced levels, such as high school. 
During the three years of high school, the teacher’s 
main task is not to address the gaps and weaknesses 
in their students’ skills and learning, but to prepare 
them for standard tests. Although the ministerial 
guidelines stipulated in circular N066-17 highlight 
the teacher’s duty to start the school year with “eval-
uation and pedagogic support” sessions, these are 
rarely integrated into the overall pedagogic program, 
with “assessment” and “evaluation” often being per-
formed to avoid criticism by school inspectors.
Schools are often judged by the Ministry of Educa-
tion not for their efforts to assist low-performing 
students, but rather on how the school as a whole 
performs in standard tests. Moreover, there is a lack 
of advanced teaching technologies, especially in the 
socioeconomically disadvantaged neighborhoods 
where migrants are most concentrated. All this, cou-
pled with the mismatch between the high number 
of Ministry-assigned teaching hours and the lower 
number of actual teaching hours, contribute to the 
Sub-Saharan children 
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country’s much-criticized low educational perfor-
mance. This has implications not only for the edu-
cation of migrant students, but also for the country’s 
overall educational policy.
Limited financial resources hinder the establish-
ment of independent educational support programs. 
Therefore, there is a need to develop mechanisms 
for granting extra support for schools with large 
migrant populations. Other countries target school 
districts in socioeconomically disadvantageous cir-
cumstances. For instance, France’s Priority Educa-
tion Zone program enables the government to direct 
additional financial resources to finance programs 
that encourage and help socioeconomically disad-
vantaged children catch up with their peers.
Pre-Service and In-Service Teacher Training
Morocco has a very sophisticated and theoretically 
exemplary process of teacher recruitment and train-
ing. The process starts with a preselection phase, in 
which only honors graduates are selected. This is 
followed by two written and oral tests, one year of 
pre-service training, and another exit exam. Last, a 
final year of service requires teachers to pass their 
“professional competency test.”
The teacher training process in Morocco has been 
continuously improved over the last ten years. The 
training philosophy now promotes cooperative and 
student-centered learning, with an emphasis on 
training in school legislation, the use of teaching 
technologies, and state-of-the-art teaching methods 
and approaches. However, neither existing training 
programs, such as the Ecole Normale Supérieure 
(ENS) or the Centre Régional des Métiers de l’Edu-
cation et de la Formation (CRMEF), exposes teachers 
to any materials on how to address migrant students 
or students with a migration background. One major 
reason for this is that migration – and more specif-
ically the management of migration through public 
policies – is a relatively recent issue in Morocco. 
As the Ministry of Education highlights the impor-
tance of continuous in-service training in its official 
discourse, the introduction of training sessions for 
teachers in school districts with major concentra-
tions of migrant students would be highly valuable.
Discrimination and Negative Public Attitudes
Throughout the 1990s until 2013, Morocco’s harsh 
approach to migration translated into a hostile and 
discriminatory discourse in the media, law, and 
regulations. The 2013 reforms marked a histori-
cal shift, and initiated a more positive and humane 
approach. Comparing media and public discourse 
towards immigration from five years ago with the 
present clearly shows that a historic change has 
taken place. In other words, Morocco is doing better 
than its neighbors when it comes to the fight against 
discrimination and racism. Although Morocco still 
detains and conducts deportation campaigns against 
migrants, this happens on a much smaller scale com-
pared to its neighbor Algeria.
However, Morocco still has much to learn from the 
experience of other neighbors, such as Tunisia and 
its fight against racism and discrimination. Currently, 
the Tunisian parliament is discussing the final techni-
cal details of a law prohibiting all forms of racism and 
discrimination. In Morocco, a draft bill has also been 
proposed, yet it has unfortunately been shelved in 
favor of more “urgent” issues. Open public discussion 
about this piece of legislation is also crucial, since 
the issue of racism should no longer be a taboo. After 
all, negative social reception and public discourse 
are major hindrances to the integration and upward 
socioeconomic mobility of migrants. Migrants can 
only thrive and progress in a receptive and tolerant 
environment. Such conditions cannot be provided by 
top-down public policies.
Recommendations
 - Consolidate the link between public schools and 
civil society
While the work of local and international NGOs on 
migrant educational needs is highly valuable, there is 
a need to further consolidate the link between pub-
The introduction of 
 training sessions for 
 teachers in districts with 
many migrant students 
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lic schools and civil society to improve cooperation 
between the two.
 - Introduce language support programs at pre-school 
and later levels
At the pre-school level, language support programs 
would smoothen transition into school life, and later 
on, boost students’ language skills necessary for 
more advanced levels.
 - Provide substantial in-service teacher training in 
school districts with large migrant populations
Given the lack of materials and content for teaching 
migrant students in pre-service training programs, 
in-service training would increase teacher compe-
tence and awareness of the need to value cultural 
diversity and promote cultural sensitivity. The Min-
istry of Education can benefit from the experience 
and expertise developed by civil society in this field.
 - Revise textbook content
Cultural sensitivity needs to be reflected not only in 
teacher training but also in textbook design. Calls to 
revise Moroccan textbooks in terms of their extrem-
ist content are gaining growing support. The most 
recent call was raised by the Moroccan MP Omar 
Balafrej over the content of Islamic Education text-
books which, among other things, promote intol-
erance towards non-Muslims and encourage strict 
and extremist interpretations of Quranic text, for 
instance, equating art and music with obscenity and 
immorality. Similarly, there is also a need to revise 
racist or racially insensitive content in textbooks. 
Hence, statements such as “I have curly hair, I feel 
ugly, what should I do?” in the first-year baccalau-
reate textbook should be removed. Such statements 
reflect discriminatory mindsets and set preconceived 
beauty standards that are internationally condemned, 
and have no place in a country that promotes itself as 
a pioneer within Africa and a leader of African unity.
 - Critically evaluate narratives
Negative public attitudes about migrants and ethnic 
minorities cannot be ended by denial discourse and 
happy-talk, but rather through a critical evaluation of 
ideas communicated in textbooks. This also extends 
to the media, which should adopt an objective and 
balanced view, instead of shifting between the two 
extremes of vilifying and praising the Other.
 - Provide extra teaching hours for migrant students 
and students from disadvantaged backgrounds
Such policies have proven highly successful through-
out the world in allowing students to catch up with 
their peers, and would certainly prove fruitful in 
Morocco. Schools hosting migrant pupils need to 
expand language support programs for Standard Ara-
bic to provide some sort of scaffolding for migrant 
students, and facilitate their transition from the pre-
school stage to primary school and beyond. In this 
regard, a broader interpretation of the ministerial 
circular N 113 on the management of “extra educa-
tional support hours” can be used to encourage such 
programs.
 - Focus on inclusive methods rather than standard-
ized tests
There is an urgent need to shift from the focus on 
standardized tests, which are typically stressful for 
both students and teachers, hinder discovery and 
exploration, and limit creativity and critical thinking. 
Instead, the focus should be on methods to integrate 
pupils with difficulties, including migrants.
 - Re-consider the role of orientation officers
Orientation officers’ contact with students should 
not be limited to giving school tours or provid-
ing brief, annual orientation sessions on preferred 
streams. Officers should also be more involved in dis-
tricts with high concentrations of migrant students.
 - Provide funding and support for initiatives such as 
the “national competition on migration”
This initiative represents a good practice that facil-
itates contact and exchange between migrant and 
native students, yet it requires better funding and 
support from the ministries in charge to produce the 
intended effect, and avoid the charge of being sim-
ply a publicity stunt. For proper implementation of 
the ideas and values envisioned in the circular, and 
an increase in student participation, the appropriate 
tools and means must be provided by the Ministry of 
Education.
 - Construct mechanisms for additional funding for 
schools with high migrant populations
Such funding mechanisms can support programs that 
help migrants integrate with their native peers. After 
all, it has been empirically proven that the impact 
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of money and resources invested in child education 
outweighs that spent on adult training.11
 - Further develop platforms such as the online stu-
dent pathway “Massar”
Platforms such as the online student pathway Mas-
sar12 must be further developed to enable parents to 
access information beyond grades and exam results, 
and thus communicate better with teachers and 
administration.
 - Initiate a second phase of reforms based on a com-
prehensive and critical assessment of current pol-
icies
The CNDH’s “Thematic Report on the Situation of 
Migrants and Refugees in Morocco” is not sufficiently 
detailed. This highlights the need for a more com-
prehensive, detailed, and critical report on the weak-
nesses of the current policy, which could initiate a 
second phase of policy reform.
Mohammed Ouhemmou is a researcher at Has-
san II University, in Casablanca. He is currently 
working on his PhD thesis which seeks to evaluate 
Moroccan migration policy. His fields of interest 
include public policy analysis, migration, interna-
tional relations, and international education. His 
research investigates the link between foreign 
policy, politics, and migration.
11 L. Bartlett, “Access and Quality of Education for International Migrant Children,” UNESCO, 2015.
12 “Massar” online student platform <https://massar.men.gov.ma/Account> (accessed June 30, 2018).
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OBSTACLES FACING ASYLUM 
SEEKERS IN NORTH-EASTERN 
MOROCCO
Jaouad Benaicha
Due to their proximity to the Spanish enclave of Mel-
illa, Morocco’s north-eastern cities of Nador and Oujda 
have seen a high influx of asylum seekers from sub-Sa-
haran African countries, but also from the conflicts 
in Syria and Libya. Among other challenges, asylum 
seekers in this region face two key obstacles: travel 
difficulties to Rabat, and violations of their rights by 
local authorities. To tackle these issues, the Ministry 
in Charge of Moroccans Living Abroad and Migration 
Affairs should create a delegation in Oujda or Nador, 
or cooperate with local NGOs to facilitate the asylum 
process. In addition, UNHCR and the international 
community should increase pressure on the Moroccan 
authorities to comply with international law. More-
over, local authorities need to improve their aware-
ness and knowledge of existing laws and the rights of 
asylum seekers.
Morocco’s geographical location makes it a signifi-
cant destination for thousands of migrants. One of 
the cities known as a migration hot-spot is Oujda. 
Its location on the Mediterranean border with Alge-
ria makes it a much-frequented passage and desti-
nation for thousands of migrants from sub-Saharan 
African countries, but also Syria and Libya. Similarly, 
Nador’s proximity to the Spanish enclave of Melilla 
has attracted a large influx of migrants from various 
countries who gather in the Gourougou forest,13 or 
areas like Zghanghan and Beni Nsar, before attempt-
ing to cross the border. The distance between Oujda 
and Nador is no more than 175 kilometers, only two 
hours by car.
Travel Difficulties and Financial Constraints 
Impeding the Asylum Application Process
One key obstacle faced by asylum seekers in Oujda 
and Nador is the fact that only one UNHCR bureau 
exists, which is in Rabat. During the application pro-
cess, all asylum seekers must present themselves in 
person at the UNHCR office. The return journey from 
Oujda takes over nine hours by train or bus, and costs 
13 “[Gourougou] is the closest point to the borders with Melilla […]. The assembly camps are distributed by nationalities (Malians, Cameroonians, 
Nigerians, Sierra Leonese, Guineans, Ivorians, Gambians, Senegalese ... with a low presence of women. Their destination is exclusively Melilla. [The camps] 
were destroyed and burned by the authorities on February 10, 2015 with the arrest and repression of almost 1,250 migrants.” Association Marocaine des 
Droits de l’Homme, “Rapport sur la situation des migrants subsahariens à Nador: Quand le Maroc et l’Espagne s’allient dans la répression des migrants 
subsahariens,” Nador, February 21, 2015.
14 The project “Droits des migrants en action” was run by the Association Al Wafae pour le Développement Social de l’Oriental between 2015-2017.
15 An appointment with the UNHCR can take six months or more.
between 260dh (€26) and 500dh (€50) per person. 
Moreover, most asylum seekers do not have a place 
to sleep or eat in Rabat. In the light of these con-
straints, many asylum seekers lose hope and are thus 
prevented from completing the process, which would 
give them the right to move freely in the country, and 
provide them with better protection from discrimi-
nation and exploitation.
Although the Moroccan government in principle 
recognizes these problems, there is no serious ini-
tiative to resolve them. While the UNHCR offers sup-
port for pregnant women and minors, it only covers 
their transportation fees. Local NGOs working on 
migrants’ issues are also aware of these difficulties, 
and try to help cover asylum seekers’ travel costs, 
but their support is limited and does not extend to 
accommodation or food. For example, the Al Wafae 
Association is one NGO that has covered transport 
costs for a very limited number of asylum seekers, 
yet because their project was EU-funded,14 migrants 
had to apply for one of the Association’s work-
shops in order to receive funds for travel to Rabat 
to claim asylum. While this is a positive example of 
NGO efforts towards migrants, there are still serious 
obstacles to overcome.
Violations of Asylum Seekers’ Rights under UNHCR 
Protection
All asylum seekers are placed under UNHCR protec-
tion until a final decision is issued regarding their 
application.15 Those whose applications are success-
ful are also placed under UNHCR protection, which 
also extends to immediate family members. Appli-
cants are normally protected against expulsion and 
oppression. If an asylum seeker or refugee is arrested, 
it is imperative for the UNHCR to be informed as 
soon as possible about their identity, place of arrest, 
and motive, in order to be able to respond quickly. 
However, migrants living in the Gourougou forest, 
who had witnessed refugees being arrested by police, 
confirmed in interviews that most migrants are not 
allowed to telephone or use any means of commu-
nication to contact the UNHCR bureau until they 
are returned to their countries of origin. Only a few 
NGOs have tried to advocate against this situation, 
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but it continues to persist in areas called “the hot 
zones,” such as Nador.
According to an activist from Guinea Bissau work-
ing as a mediator between the MS2 Association and 
migrants in Nador, “a black-skinned person does not 
have the freedom to move in the streets of the city.”16 
The refugees and asylum seekers can be arrested by 
police even if they can present their asylum seeker 
certificate from the UNHCR bureau. This suggests 
that some police officers either do not know or 
ignore the laws related to refugees and their right to 
protection against expulsion.
Recommendations
To better facilitate asylum seekers’ access to UNHCR 
services, the Moroccan government and UNHCR, 
together with EU migration organizations, should 
seek to remove the existing obstacles. Solving these 
issues can certainly improve conditions for migrants 
and serve as proof of efforts made by UNHCR and 
the Moroccan government to protect the rights of 
migrants in Morocco without discrimination. The 
integration of refugees into Moroccan society can 
contribute to the economic and social development 
of the country, and enrich Moroccan cultural diver-
sity. Internationally, granting more rights to asylum 
seekers would emphasize that Morocco respects and 
successfully applies international treaties related 
to refugees, especially the 1951 Geneva Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, and its 1967 New 
York Protocol.
 - Create a delegation of the Ministry in Charge of 
Moroccans Living Abroad and Migration Affairs in 
Oujda or Nador
Such a delegation should be able to provide asylum 
seekers with all necessary services to file and process 
their asylum requests, thus circumventing the need 
to travel to Rabat.
 - Increase cooperation with local NGOS
Alternatively, the Ministry in Charge of Moroccans 
Living Abroad and Migration Affairs delegation could 
collaborate with local organizations, such as the 
Moroccan Organization of Human Rights (OMDH), 
which is already involved in helping asylum seekers 
get UNHCR appointments, or the Moroccan Asso-
16 An interview with Mr. Zeca Dasilva, working as a mediator between MS2 and migrants in Nador.
ciation of Human Rights (AMDH), to allow them to 
provide the necessary services in Oujda and Nador.
 - Fund projects that provide financial assistance to 
asylum seekers travelling to Rabat
As long as asylum applications can only be processed 
in Rabat, projects should be created and funded that 
would allow local NGOs to facilitate the access of 
asylum seekers to UNHCR services, by financing their 
travels to Rabat. These projects should be well-man-
aged and monitored by specialists in the field.
 - Increase pressure on the Moroccan authorities to 
comply with international law
UNHCR and the international community should 
increase pressure on the Moroccan authorities 
to ensure that they comply with international law 
regarding the suppression of refugees and asylum 
seekers awaiting a response from the UNHCR.
 - Advocate on behalf of the rights of asylum seekers
The Ministry in Charge of Moroccans Living Abroad 
and Migration Affairs and NGOs working on migrants’ 
issues should advocate more on behalf of asylum 
seekers’ rights, such as the right to non-suppression, 
and the right to move freely.
 - Educate local authorities on legal procedures and 
the rights of asylum seekers
In many police stations, officers are unaware of the 
legal procedures concerning migration and migrants’ 
rights. The Ministry in Charge of Moroccans Living 
Abroad and Migration Affairs and UNHCR should 
organize awareness-raising days for the police to 
clarify the new procedures for dealing with migrants. 
This is especially relevant in areas called “the hot 
zones.”
Jaouad Benaicha is a project assistant at the 
AMSED Association working on the social integra-
tion of migrants in Oujda city, Morocco. He also 
volunteers for the Oujda Youth Council, the Ori-
ental Region Youth Hostel Association, and other 
local NGOs. In addition, the creator of the “Pass-
port to Success Program.
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BUILDING BRIDGES – MOROCCAN 
CIVIL SOCIETY AS A MEDIATOR 
IN EU DECISION-MAKING ON 
MIGRATION
Ilham Siba
Due to its geographic position, Morocco is heavily 
implicated in migration policies between Europe and 
Africa, and frequently plays the role of guardian with 
respect to the flow of migrants from Africa crossing 
the Mediterranean. Yet in many cases, human rights 
conditions remain problematic. To improve the situ-
ation, Moroccan civil society actors – who can act as 
a bridge between migrants in Morocco and European 
decision-makers – should be given a stronger voice 
and included in decision-making processes.
Europe maintains increasingly rigorous control of its 
borders, including a militarized closure of Spanish 
enclaves, maritime patrols, and the creation in Octo-
ber 2016 of the European Border and Coast Guard 
Agency Frontex, which employs at least 1,500 bor-
der guards and other staff to be deployed in rapid 
interventions.17 Because of its location, and the pres-
ence on its territory of the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta 
and Melilla, Morocco has become a transit country 
for many migrants. Following the implementation of 
the country’s National Strategy for Immigration and 
Asylum in 2013, Morocco regularized over 23,000 
out of a total of 27,64918 migrants between 2014 and 
2015, most of whom were trying to reach Europe. At 
the same time, Morocco has become a crucial part-
ner for the European Union in managing migration 
flows from Africa to Europe. Consequently, Morocco 
has become the unwanted home for many refugees 
and migrants trying to make their way to Europe, 
especially those from Sub-Saharan Africa, who find 
themselves stuck at the borders near Ceuta and 
Melilla. An estimated 13,000 Sub-Saharan migrants 
were apprehended each year at Morocco’s borders 
between 2000 and 2009.19 More recently, Sub-Saha-
17 Missions and Tasks, Frontex European Border and Coast Guard Agency, <https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/mission-tasks/> (accessed June 17, 
2018).
18 2017 Report of the National Strategy of Immigration and Asylum by the Ministry in charge of Migration
19 MPC Team, “Migration Profile: Morocco,” Migration Policy Center, European University Institute, June 2013 <http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/
migration_profiles/Moroc co.pdf> (accessed July 10, 2018).
20 Hein de Haas, “Myths of migration: Much of what we think we know is wrong,” March 29, 2017 <http://heindehaas.blogspot.com/2017/03/myths-of-
migration-much-of-what-we.html> (accessed June 17, 2018).
21 “Missing Migrants,” International Organization for Migration <https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/mediterranean> (accessed June 17, 2018).
22 Laura Thompson, “A World on the Move: The Benefits of Migration,” speech delivered in Brussels, International Organization for Migration, September 
25, 2014 <https://www.iom.int/speeches-and-talks/world-move-benefits-migration> (accessed June 17, 2018).
23 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations <http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html> (accessed June 17, 
2018).
24 Rights, groups and discrimination, GSDRC Applied Knowledge Services <http://gsdrc.org/topic-guides/human-rights/rights-groups-and-
discrimination/#mig> (accessed June 17, 2018).
25 Nadia Lamlili, “Mehdi Alioua: «Le Maroc doit réformer la loi sur la migration pour la rendre plus humaine»,” Jeune Afrique, December 14, 2016 <http://
www.jeuneafrique.com/383584/societe/mehdi-alioua-maroc-reformer-loi-migration-rendre-plus-humaine/> (accessed June 17, 2018).
ran migrants have been joined by refugees and asy-
lum seekers from the conflicts in Syria, Libya, and 
Iraq.
Borders and Migration Flow
According to migration researcher Hein De Haas, 
the closure of borders and the introduction of visas 
do not directly produce a decrease in the migration 
flow.20 While these policies might lessen the num-
bers of migrants entering the country, they encour-
age them to stay in the country where they presently 
reside. In addition, controlling borders tends to cre-
ate more room for irregular migration and trafficking, 
which in turn puts migrants at great risk. As a result, 
many lose their lives in their quest to seek refuge or 
better living conditions; around 1,000 people lost 
their lives in the Mediterranean in 2017.21
Migration is beneficial for migrants in terms of 
improved personal and family situations, and it also 
benefits the host country and the country of ori-
gin. Such benefits include economic growth for the 
host country from the contributions of both high- 
and low-skilled migrants; net contributions to wel-
fare systems; an increase in trade and investment 
between host and origin countries; remittances; and 
returning migrants investing in their countries of ori-
gin.22 But these benefits are only possible when the 
human rights of the migrants are protected under 
Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights,23 and when migrants are empowered in their 
transit and host countries. Otherwise the exclusion 
of migrants risks creating great tension that can 
lead to violence, vulnerability to crime, and crime 
increases in the communities where migrants live.24 
Consequently, civil society organizations (CSOs) have 
been advocating for a reform of migration laws that 
respects human rights and international standards.25
Chapter III: Migration Policies 
49No. 3 | January 2020 – first published in June 2018
REPORT
Morocco still criminalizes 
any attempt to leave the 
country illegally
Migration and the Mobility Partnership Signed 
Between the EU and Morocco
The first objective of the 2013 mobility partnership 
signed between Morocco and the EU26 was to facil-
itate the movement of migrants between the two 
continents, as well as the issuing of visas for certain 
groups. The second objective was to inform Moroc-
can citizens on legal forms of migration, and to sup-
port migrants’ integration. The third objective was to 
combat smuggling and human trafficking. It is there-
fore of paramount importance to establish an asylum 
and protection system in Morocco.
Even though Morocco has implemented its National 
Strategy of Immigration and Asylum, and signed the 
Mobility Partnership, human rights concerns remain, 
as Morocco still criminalizes any attempt to leave the 
country illegally. It also imposes prison sentences 
and fines for illegal migrant workers in its territory 
under Law 02.03.27 Many migrants and refugees, 
including minors, pregnant women, and new moth-
ers, are denied their human rights when caught at 
the borders, and risk illegal deportation.
Cooperation between Moroccan Civil Society and 
European Decision-Makers
Associations in Morocco do exist that play an active 
role in migration issues, many of them focusing on 
migrants’ human rights. These civil society organiza-
tions (CSOs) want to have their concerns heard by 
both Moroccan and European decision-makers, with 
some of them explicitly expressing this interest in a 
position paper.28
In addition to the dangers and possible death faced 
when attempting to cross the border, migrants and 
refugees spend months stuck in the forests near the 
borders in very poor, inhuman conditions.29 Through 
advocacy work aimed at Morocco and the EU, civil 
society plays a major role in promoting awareness of 
human rights conditions and respect for the rights 
of migrants and refugees. These awareness-raising 
26 Migration and mobility partnership signed between the EU and Morocco, European Commission, Press Release Database, June 7, 2013 <http://europa.
eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-513_en.htm> (accessed June 17, 2018).
27 Law 02.03 on the entry and residence of foreigners in the Kingdom of Morocco, on emigration and irregular migration <http://www.gadem-asso.org/
wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Loi_02-03.pdf> (accessed June 17, 2018).
28 Papier de Position: pour un soutien de l’Union Européenne et de ses Etats-membres à une approche des migrant(e)s et des refugié(e)s au Maroc 
Rationnelle, Humaine et basée sur le Droit : https://ma.boell.org/sites/default/files/uploads/2018//papier_de_posi tion.pdf
29 Plateforme Nationale Protection Migrants, “Contribution de la société civile dans le cadre de l’Examen Périodique Universel du Maroc – Mai 2017” 
<http://www.pnpm.ma/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/EPU-Maroc-2017-contribution-Plateforme-Nationale-Protection-des-Migrants-1.pdf> (accessed 
July 10, 2018).
30 Nouhad Fathi, “Du racisme décomplexé sur le web marocain,” La Dépeche, March 21, 2018 <https://ladepeche.ma/racisme-decomplexe-web-
marocain/> (accessed June 17, 2018).
31 Groupe antiraciste d’accompagnement et de défense des étrangers et migrants (GADEM) and Worldwide Movement for Human Rights (FIDH), “Rapport 
FIDH et GADEM : “Maroc : entre rafles et régularisations, bilan d’une politique migratoire indécise,” March 2015 <http://www.gadem-asso.org/rapport-fidh-
et-gadem-maroc-entre-rafles-et-regularisations-bilan-dune-politique-migratoire-indecise/> (accessed July 10, 2018).
activities mostly take place through art and culture, 
with the use of various tools such as theatre, movie 
screenings, storytelling, music, and experience shar-
ing. These tools are also used to address the fact 
that a large part of Moroccan society still refuses the 
presence of migrants in the country, which some-
times results in violence.30 CSO activities have aimed 
at reaching and engaging more people through cul-
tural events, such as the Festival migrant’scène Rabat, 
Africano Mohammedia, and Festival Rabat Africa. In 
addition, CSOs actively support the integration of 
migrants in universities, the job market, housing, 
and child education. Civil society has also initiated 
mobilization campaigns, such as the #Free_man-
dika campaign in support of a pregnant Congolese 
woman, who was held at the airport and threatened 
with deportation under Law 02.03.
Moroccan civil society has already demonstrated its 
ability to contribute to domestic decision-making. 
Prior to the launch of the National Strategy of Immi-
gration and Asylum, CSOs were consulted on the 
elaboration of its human rights aspects. They have 
also contributed to the adjustment and evaluation 
of public policies and laws related to human rights, 
migration, and asylum through the implementation 
of a National Commission for Follow-up and Appeal. 
This Commission is tasked with following up the reg-
ularization campaign during the National Strategy for 
Immigration and Asylum campaign in 2013, and the 
regular evaluation of its progress.31
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Many of the changes in migration policy are the fruits 
of the hard work by a very active and mobilized civil 
society, as mentioned in the report of the National 
Council of Human Rights (CNDH).32 Civil society plays 
the role of a social mediator between migrants and 
Moroccan citizens, and helps improve the country’s 
lawmaking to respond to the needs of its people. 
Whether in the transit countries such as Morocco, or 
in destination countries, civil society is very keen to 
play a role, if it is officially and adequately included in 
decision-making processes. 
Recommendations
 - Ensure greater inclusion of Moroccan civil society 
in the decision-making process
Moroccan CSOs should be invited and consulted by 
European decision-makers when deciding on poli-
cies which concern migrants travelling to Europe via 
Morocco. This will allow Moroccan CSOs to play an 
active role as mediators, and to voice the concerns 
of migrants.
 - Allocate a specific share of development aid to 
smaller NGOs in Morocco
A large share of development aid from the European 
Union, and Germany in particular (via the GIZ), goes 
to large governmental institutions.33 A share should 
be specified for small Moroccan NGOs to help them 
cooperate with citizens and migrants in order to 
mediate and bring them closer to both parties. This 
will enable them to better inform and cooperate with 
governments in policy-making, and to create a bridge 
between governments and migrants.
 - Revise the mobility partnership signed between 
Morocco and the EU
The partnership should be reviewed and based on 
a human rights approach instead of border securi-
ty-based laws. The inclusion of Moroccan civil soci-
ety actors, especially those who work on human 
rights, should be guaranteed.
32 National Human Rights Council (CNDH), “Thematic Report on Situation of Migrants and Refugees in Morocco. Foreigners and Human Rights in Morocco: 
For a Radically New Asylum and Migration Policy” <http://cndh.ma/sites/default/files/documents/CNDH_report_-_migration_in_Morocco.pdf> (accessed 
June 17, 2018).
33 Heinrich Böll Stiftung, “EU and German external migration policies: The case of Morocco,” March 19, 2018 <https://ma.boell.org/fr/2018/03/19/
eu-and-german-external-migration-policies-case-morocco> (accessed July 10, 2018).
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